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REV G VEIL PIERCING FOR ALL LIMITED 
IIJABIUTY ENTITIES: FORCING ~ COMMON LAW 
DOCTRINE INTO THE STATUTORY AGE 
Rebecca]. Huss • 
This is an exciting time in business, organizational law. The·availabil-
ity of new types of limited liability e11tities (LLEs) provides an opportu-
nity to re-evaluate doctrines that ha,ve become entrenched in common 
law.t In every state, legislatures have created new and more flexible 
. 
entities in which to hold assets. The two "new" entity forms that have 
been universally adopted are the lirnited liability company (LLC) and 
limited liability partnership (LLP).2 Now that the provisions of these 
LLE statutes are beginning to settle into some semblance of stability, it 
is time to consider the application of common law "corporate" doctrines 
to these entities.3 
Although there is evidence that allowing individuals to be shielded 
from personal liability for entity debts is a net benefit to society; there 
are costs generated by this system.4~ One of these costs is that some 
creditors will not be paid if the entity has insufficient assets. The limited 
liability system assigns the risk of tltis nonpayment to these creditors. 
Under certain circumstances, courts have created exceptions to the 
general limited liability rule to redress unfairness in this risk allocation 
system. One common law doctrine that has developed to eliminate the 
• Assistant Professor, Valparaiso University School of Law; LL.M. University of Iowa, 1995; J.D. 
University of Richmond, 1992. The author wishes to thank Peter Huang and john D. Mandelbaum for their 
comments. This paper also ben~fited from the comme:ntsofLaura Dooley, Alex Geisinger, Linda Whitton, 
and the other participants of the Valparaiso University faculty colloquium. Special thanks to the Col. Erwin 
A. jones Faculty Development Endowment and Erwir1 A.Jones,Jr. for funding this project . 
. 
I. I .I.E in this paper refers to LLCs and I.I.Ps. Corporations are treated outside the definition of 
an LLE although they dearly are entities with limited liability protection. 
2: "New" entity is a somewhat broad way to describe 1 J .Ps as they are simply general partnerships 
that have elected to take advantage of certain limited liability protections provided for by I .. LP provisions. 
Su infra text accompanying note I 2 (description of the l.LP entity). Some states have also adopted provisions 
allowing the general partners of limited p~rtnerships to take advantage of a limited liability shield. These 
entities are referred to as "limited liability limited partnerships•' or LLLPs. Su in.fra text accompanying notes 
13-20 (discussion of LPs and LI.I,Ps). 
3. During the early y·ears after LLC statutes were adopted, the amendment of the statutes was a 
regular occurrence. Since the amendments that occurred after the "check the box" regulations were 
implemented, providing more certainty as ~o the tax treatment of LLCs, states have continued to amend 
LLC provisions but with fewer wholesale changes. See infra notes 9-11 and accompanying text. 
4. Professor Thompson states that "the continued judicial preference for limited liability in 
corporate groups ... may reflect a society-wide judgment that the benefits of limited liability exceed its 
costs." Robert B. Thompson, Unpacking limiJed 1~: Direct and V~emious li4bi.Ji!y ofCorporau Participanlsfor 
Torts of tire Enlerprise, 47 VAND. L. REV. I, 23 (1994). Su in.fra text accompanying notes 37-76 (discussion of 
li111itecl lial>ilit)f). 
• 
• 
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limited liability shield is referred to as "piercing the corporate veil" · 
(hereinafter referred to as piercing the veil or veil piercing). Unfortu-
nately, the veil piercing doctrine is not consistently applied by the 
courts. 5 Interest holders and creditors alike are unable to determine the 
circumstances in which the theory can be applied successfully because 
of the differences in standards used by the courts:. The veil piercing 
theory as it has been applied is so seriously flawed that the time has 
come to reconsider the use of the common law concept at all. It is time 
for the adoption of a cohe.re.nt method to deal with the perceived unfair-
ness in risk allocation for all entities with limited liability protection. 
This paper proposes that legislatures adopt a statutory provision 
codifying the best ~spects of the veil piercing doctrine in order to 
provide courts with a framework to apply the doctrine consistendy. 
Along with a new statutory framework, the increa~ed use of existing 
fraudulent transfer provisions and the implementation of other statutory 
reforms is recommended to provide creditors with a remedy in 
• • 
appropnate c1rcumsta~ces. 
To provide support for the implementation and increased use of 
statutory provisions, this paper begins with a brief history and descrip-
tion of the new IJ .. Es and discusses some of the basic theories supporting 
limited liability. A general overview of the veil piercing doctrine and its. 
likely application to these new entities follows.6 Finally, this paper 
argues that the time is ripe to explore and implement ideas for accom-
plishing the goals of veil piercing in a more consistent manner . 
• 
I. NEW LIMITED LIABIUTY ENTI'fiES 
A. History of New Limited Liabili~ Entities 
The LLC is an entity form that combines the management flexibility 
and tax advantages of the partnership structure with limited liability 
protection for interest holders similar to the protection provided to 
shareholders of cotporations. Unlike the corporate structure, which has 
existed in the United States since before the U.S. was a sovereign 
5. Professor Blumberg states that piercing the corporate veil "fails to provide a workable framework 
for analysis, but it still largely prevails,,. PHIWPI. BLUMBERG, THEJ..AWOFCORPORATEGROUPS, TORT, 
CONTRACT, AND OTHER COMMON LAW PROBLEMS IN TiiE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF PARENT AND 
SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS, at xxxvi ( 1987 &. Supp. 2000). 
6. As few courts have decided cases concerning the application of the doctrine to I .I .Es, one must 
look to statutory language and make analogies to issues raised in corporate cases to deternaine what factors 
a court is likely to consider. 
• 
• 
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nation, LLCs are a recent phenomenon.7 The first U.S. LLC statute 
was passed in 1977 by the state of Wyoming,. although similar entity 
forms have been available and are relatively common outside the U.S.8 
The uncertain tax status of LLCs hampered the adoption of LLC 
statutes· in the 1·980s and early 1990s.9 Mter almost a decade of 
interaction between private p,arties interested in LLCs ,and the IRS, on 
January l, 1997, the IRS implemented "check the box" rules that allow 
any business entity that is not requirc!d to b,e treated as a corporation fo,r 
federal _tax purposes to essentially choose the manner in which it will be 
taxed. 10 Even prior to the check the box rules, however, the growth in 
7. Su Susan Pace Hamill, 1M Origins Bekind lhllimiled Liabili!)l Compa19, 59 OHIO ST~ LJ. I 459, 1485 
(1998). 
8. Sel UJ. at 1460. Pro(essor Hamill's article describes in detail the story behind the Wyoming LLC 
statute and the development of the LLC as a popular choice of business entity. Su gmeral!1. id . . Florida was 
the second state to enact an lLC statute in 1982. Jd. at 1469. Entities similar to LLCs have been available 
in other countries for a long period of time. Debra Cohen· Whelan, Individual &s. · . · · in llt8 W~ of 
limiltd Liabilig, 32· U.S.F. L. Rtv. 335, 338 (1998). Sa also Steven C. Bahls, AppliclllUm of Corpora~~ Common 
law Doctrines kJ Limiled liohili~ Companils, 55 MONT. L. REV. 43, 46 ( 1994); Shaun M. Klein, Piercing lite Jltil 
ofllll limiltd /Mhili!Y Company,fo;m Suu &lto long SlwL· Gallinger v. North Star Hospital Mutual Assuranc~, 
Ltd., 22 IOWA J. CORP. L. 131, 131 n.l ( 1996). Sd also generally WiUiamJ. Carney, Limiled Liabili!Y Companw: 
Origins andAnl«edmts, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 855 (1995). The Wyoming statute was specifically forrnulated 
to try to secure partnership classification status for federal tax purposes for a U.S. unincorporated entity. 
Hamill, supra note 7, at 1466. The first LLC forrncd under the Wyoming LLC statute was ultimately 
successful in obtaining a private letter ruling allowing for pannership classification. Jd. at 1467. See also Dale 
A. Oesterle, Subcrmenls in UC StaJuJes: LimiJin& 1M Diserehtm ofSiok. Courts llJ Restrueture 1M Intmud Affairs of Smll!J 
Bwin.us. 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 881, 881 (1995)~ Although corporations electing Subchapter Shave similar 
tax characteristics, there are difFerences in the taxtreaun.ent ofS corporations and partnerships. In addition, 
although restrictions relating to Subchapter S corporation shareholders have been loosened, there is more 
flexibility in the LLC ownership structure. Set I'M'ai!Y Scott Kapusta and Brian Nichols, Limited Liabilig 
· •. 1714 OplimtJJBwVws Organitalj.onj01the T~-First Cenlury?, 9ST.jOHN'Sj.LEGALCOMMENT. 803 
(1994)~ 
9. Between 1980 and 1988, the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) position relating to the tax 
classification of LLCs remained unclear leaving the fc:deral tax status of LLCs in limbo during that time. 
Hamill, supra note 7, at 1468-69. Due to ,this uncertain tax status, there was limited use and slow 
development of LLC statutes during the 1980s. Jd. at 1469. Then, on September 2, J 988, the IRS issued 
a Revenue Ruling that pernlitted a Wyoming LLC to be classified as a partnership based on its application 
of a specified set of factors relating to the entity•s "non-c:orporate" status. Rev. Rut 88·76t 1988-2 C.B. 360. 
Thus, the IRS would apply a set of factors to classify each LLC for tax purposes, including (I) limited 
liability, (2) continuity oflife, (3) free transferability of ownership, (4) centralized management, (5) association 
of members and (6) entity formed to carry on business. William H. Copperthwaite, Jr., Limited Liabili9 
Companw: 1M Clwitefqr the Futur,, 103 COM. L.J. 222, 224 (1998). In order to make certain that the IRS 
would treat an entity as a partnership, the a(tomey involved in the process had to make certain that each 
' 
LLC lacked at a minimum two of the first four characteristics. Much of the· commentary on LLCs prior to 
1997 discussed i'ssues relating to these corporate attributes. After the 1988 Revenue RulingJ :several states 
passed LLC statUtes, although the usc of LLCs was complicated by the individual application of the IRS' 
factors to deterrnine pannership tax treatment. • 
10. Treas. Reg.§ 301.7701-1 (1997) et seq. (WgSTLAW throughjanuary J, 2001). &eal.ro Hamill, 
supra note 7, at 1474-83 {describing the interaction of the IRS with interested parties, including committees 
of the American Bar Association). Note that under Internal Revenue Code§ 7704, certain publicly held 
partnerships will be treated as corporations for tax pua·poses~ 26 U.s~c § 7704 (200 I) (West; WESTLAW 
• 
• 
., 
• • 
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LLC filings can. only be viewed as tremendous, and it is likely that the 
trend will be that increasing num·bers of·LLCs will be for1ned. 11 
An LLP is a general partnership that has elected to take advantage of 
a limited liability protection provision. The history of LLPs is shorter 
than that of LLCs, with the fi~st statute providing for LLPs enacted in 
Texas in 1991.12 Unlike the LLC provisions that stand as separate 
sections of a state's code, provisions providing for LLPs are g~nerally 
added to a state's existing partnership act. 
It is important to briefly discuss limited liability limited partnerships 
(LLLPs)~ Historically, limited partnership (LP) statutes provided that at 
least one partner (the general partner) would be subject to unlimited 
liability. 13 To limit the risk of liability to the ultimate interest holders,_ 
most general partners in LPs would consist of an entity with a liability 
through Pub. L. No. I 06-580, approved 12-29-2000). The "check the box'• rules free the practitioner from 
the task of structuring LLC documents in a manner calculated to pass the IRS factors relating to corporate 
characteristics and provide certainty as to the tax treatment of the entity. 
11. Susan Pace Hamill, 'I'M LimiUd Lia~ Company: A Catagst Exposing~ Corporale Integration Qgestinn, 
95 MICH. L. REV. 393, 395 ( 1996). Professor Hamill provides an appendix s~tting forth the approximate 
, number of new LLC filings in several states. I d. at 44()..46. Su also James_ G. Leyden;J r ·;A K9 SlQJe '.f App:roach 
to UCs: Delaware can be Differmt, Bus. L. TODAY, May-june 2000, at 51. More than 100,000 LLCs have 
been formed under Delaware law in comparison with approximately 290,000 Delaware corporations. ld . 
• After the check the box rules, there· was another wave of amendments to state lLC statutes to reflect the 
ability ofthc entities to maintain partnership classification regardless of the application of the IRS' corporate 
·characteristic factors. Set generai!J Laurel Wheeling Farrar &. Susan Pace Hamill, DissociaJion from Alabama 
Limiled Liahili!J CfJmpanw in 1111 Posl Check-1M-Box Era~ 49 ALA. L. REV. 909 { 1988). Although the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Unifor:m State Laws (NCCUSL) has developed a Uniform ·umited 
Liability Company Act (ULLCA), most states have not yet been receptive to adopting the provisions as a 
whole, and there are still significant differences in individual state LLC statutes. Kathleen D. Fuentes, limited 
Li4hili9 Companies and Opting-Out qfliJJbilig: A New Sltmdatdfor Fiduciary DulW?, 27 SETON HAiJ.L. REV. I 023, 
I 024 ( 1997). Some commentators dispute the usefulne~ of having states adopt a uniform LLC _act See, ~.g., 
Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Uniform lmt.•s, Motkllows and LimiJed Liahilig Companies, 66 U. 
Cow. L. REV. 947 (1995) (asserting that the ULLCA is unnecessary and is likely to make LLC law less 
efficient). In some states it is still not possible to fonn a single member LLC, and there are significant 
differences in how states treat LLCs for state tax purposes. Sugeneral!J CaroiJ. Miller et al., limiJed liahili!J 
Companw Bifor~ and After ~ ]anUilty 1997 JRS "Check-tke•Box" &gulalions: Clwice uf Enti!J and Tnxation 
Considerations, 25 N. KY. L. REV. 585 {1998). See also generalg Bruce P. Ely 8t Peter· C. Bond, State Taxalitm tif 
ILCs, UPs and Rl.LPs, An Updalt, 2 Bus. ENTITlES 38 (2000). 
12~ Paul R. Erickson &BuddyJ. Sanders,Asses.fUwUCsv.UPs, 28TEXASTECHL. REV. 1005, 1005 
( 1997). The establishment of the LLP was triggered by the savings and loan failures in the 1980s and 
subsequent lawsuits against lawyers and accountants relating to their bank and thrift work. Robert W. 
Hamilton, /Ugirlered limiled liahifitJ Partnerships: Present at lhe Birth (Hear~), 66 U. COLO. L. REV. I 065, 1069 
(1995). Similar to the LLC statutes, many LIP provisions have been the focus of amendment since their 
implementation. NCCUSL adopted limited liability partnership amendments to its Uniform Partnership 
Act at its annual meeting in July 1996. The amended act is hereinafter referred to as the ULLPA. 
EUZABETH G. HESTER, Prt~ttical GWk to RAgislertd Limild LiJJbili/y Partnerships, in 5 STATE LIMITED LIABIUTY 
COMPANY AND PARTNERSHIP LAWS§ 1 (Michael A. Bamberger & Arthur J.Jacobson eds., 1995). See also 
generaJ!y CanerJ. Bishop, 'Tiu8 Limiltd LUzhilig Partnership Ammdmmts ltJ Ike Uniform Partnrrship Act ( 1994), 53 Bus. 
L. I 0 1 ( 1997). . 
13. SugeneraJ9 CLEMENT BATES, THELAWOFLIMITEDPARTNERSHIP 33 (1886). 
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shield, usually a corporation.14 Limited partners were at risk for 
personal liability for LP obligations only if they participated in the 
control of the business and if the creditor reasonably believed that they 
were acting as general partners. 15 As .LP statutes developed, safe harbor 
provisions were drafted delineating the types of activities that a limited 
partner could participate in without lo$ing limited liability status. 16 
A state that has adopted LLLP lattguage allows the general partner 
of the LP to have the same type of protection that is available to general 
partners electing LLP status. 17 The treatment oflimited partners in a 
LLLP is complicated by the states' adoption of language in the Revised 
Uniform Limited Partnership Act (RULPA), providing that the, Uniform 
Partnership Act provisions only apply to cases not provided for in the 
RULPA. 18 As the RULPA includes specific rules relating to the 
personal liability of a limited partner to a creditor, it appears that the 
judiciary would respect those RULPA rules. 19 Due to the difference in 
the way that limited partners have historically lost their limited liability 
status and the lack of universal adoption of provisions allowing LPs to 
become 14I .. I,Ps, the focus in this paper will be on LLCs and I .. IJPs.20 
B. Description of UCs and UPs 
In addition to establishing an entity by fuing a simple short document 
with the relevant governmental authority, most members ofLLCs enter 
into "Operating Agreements" that define-the relationship among the 
members. Operating Agreements generally include provisions relating 
to the allocation of membership interests, tax benefits and profits as well 
• 
14. Gases have consistently held that the use of a corporation to act as a _general partner of a limited 
partnership is valid absent fraud. E.g.1 Frigidaire Sales Corp. v. Union Prop., Inc~, 562 P.2d 244 {Wash. 
1977) (illustrating 'the ability or a corporation to act· as a general partner ofa limited partnership). 
15. Bishop, SU/J'ftJ note 12, at Ill. 
16. .SU, ,.g., REV._ UNJF. LTD. p•sHIPACT § 303 (1976) (amended 1985) [hereinaner RULPA]. 
17. The LP files the necessary fonns to elect U.P status and the general partners of the LP are 
covered by the same limited liability language as panner'S in UPs. &, ~og., ARJZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 29-
1 026 (West, WESTLA W thro\.lgh 2000 2d Reg. Sess. and 5th Spec. Sess.) (stating that as to limited \) 
partnerships, which are-limited liability partnerships, the section on partner liability (including the language 
relating to entity formalities) will apply to "general partners and to any of its limited panners who, ... are 
liable for the debts or obligations of the pannership'•); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-214 (WESTLAW 
through 2000 Reg. Sess.); Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 359.172 (West, WESTLA W through 2d Reg. Sess., of the 90th 
General Asscmb. (2000)). 
18. RULPA § 1105 (1985). 
19. Bishop~ SUJirG note 12, at Ill. 
20. As of january I, 2001, only sixteen_ states_ had statutory provisions relating to the LLLP fornt. 
Dem A. Hopkins, U/Ps- A New limiletlliobilig Optima, CCH Limited liability Company Guide: lLC 
Advisor, Nov. 16,2000, at 4. This article also discusses dae fact that some states appear to recognize I.IJ.Ps 
without a specific statuto.ry provision. /d. 
. 
100 UN.IVERSirr OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70 
as set forth the management structure of the LLC.21 There are two 
different general structures for the management of LLCs. 22 In the first 
structure, the members retain the right to manage the entity. In the 
second structure, the members provide for one or more managers to 
manage the entity. The ability of all of the members to be involved in 
the management of the entity without losing their limited liability status 
(unlike limited partners of an LP) is c.onsidered to be a significant 
advantage of the LLC structure.23 The management and control of an 
entity may be a significant issue if there is a claim that the limited 
liability shield should be pierced in order to access the assets of an 
individual member. 
A general partnership establishes itself as an LLP by filing a document 
with the relevant governmental authority. The remainder of the 
provisions of a state's partnership act will continue to apply to a LLP as 
if it was a general partnership. Unlike LLCs, where there is still 
uncertainty as to the guidelines that will be placed on individual 
members and their relationships, the standards that have applied to 
general partners will likely apply in LLPs without change. A reflection 
of this is that q~alification of a general partnership as an LLP does not 
require any substantive modification of such entity's general partnership 
agreement.24 In fact, some provisions, including the Revised Uniform 
Partnership Act, specifically provide that a general partnership that files 
for LLP status is the same entity before and after registration.25 
Some states have imposed additional requirements on general 
partnerships desiring to obtain I.I.P status. Several states have adopted 
mandatory insurance requirements for LLPs. 26 Some of these insurance 
2 J • Unlike corporation statutes, LLC statutes generally do not provide for specific corporate 
• 
formalities, such as annual meetings for interest holden; thus, even if an Operating Agreement is not 
required by the relevant state statute, as a practical measure it is necessary for the members to enter into 
some type of agreement relating to the organization of the entity. 
22. State statutes generally require that if an LLC is to be manager managed, that fact must be set 
out in the Articles of Organization filed with the Secretary of State's office. What will be most striking to 
someone who is familiar with standard features of corporate codes is not what is similar but what appears 
to be missing in LLC statutes. For example, generally there are no· safeguards for interest holders in the 
entities to have a say in the management of the entity absent the election of the entity to be member 
managed. This "lack of protection'' illustrates the Oexibility that parties have in fornaing LLCs. 
23. Initially, the tax benefits available by using this new entity were considered the primary reason 
for the explosion in use of LLCs. In addition, there are significant advantages to the business and 
management provisions found in LLC statutes. Hamill, supra note 11, at 395. . 
24. The agreement would, of course, have to be amended to reflect the entity's new status as an LLP 
and the new name, but all other issues such as contribution, profit and loss allocations are not impacted by 
the addition of the limited liability shield. 
25. RUPA § 201(b) (1997). 
26. Su, ~wg., AK. STAT.§ 32.05.565 (Matthew Bender, WESTLAW through Third Spec. Sess. of the 
Twenty-First Leg. (2000)); CAL CORP. CODE§ 16956 (West, WESTLAW through 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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requirements apply only if the IJ..P partners are licensed to provide 
professional seiVices, and there are often alternatives to insurance.27 
The minimum monetary requirements also vary considerably, with 
some of the limits determined by th~~ number of partners. 28 
' 
C. Liabili!J Provisions of UCs and LlPs 
Common among all LLC statutes are provisions articulating the 
general rule that members and managers ofLLCs Will not be responsi-
ble for the LLCs' debts or liabilities solely because of their status as 
members or managers.29 Unlike corporate statutes' liability provisions 
that have developed a commonality throughout the long history of 
corpo~ate law, the language used in liability provisions ofLLC statutes 
varies significantly among the states. 30 One distinction can be made by 
analyzing who will be covered by the provisions. The coverage can 
ranie from members alone to members, managers, agents and employ-
ees. 1 As in the case of officers and directors of corporations, members 
. 
and J st Exec. Sess. and Nov. 7, 2000 Election); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, subtit.ll, ch. 15 § 1546 {WESTLA W 
through 1999 1st Spec. Sess.); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 54,§ 1-309 (West, WESTLAW through Chapter 9 
of2000 lst Exec. Sess.); S.C.CooEANN. § 3341·1130 (WESTLAW through 2000 Reg. Sess.); TEX. REV. 
STAT.ANN.art.6J32b,§3.08{West, WESTLAWthrough 1999Reg. Sess.); W. VA.CODEANN.§47B-10-5 
(Matthew Bender, WESTLAW through 2000 1st Exec. Sess~)· . 
27. Su, t.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§ 25.05.125 (West, ·WESTLAW through 2000 2d Spec. SeS5.). 
Initially, it was thought that professionals such as attonteys and accountants would be the most likely. to 
utilize I J .P provisions, even though most statutes do not limit their use to professional pannerships. Sa 
Hester, supra note 12, § 1. 
28. Stt 15 PA. CONS. STAT.§ 8206 (West, WESTLAW through 2000 Reg. Sess.). 
29. For a case interpreting the liability language of the Delaware statute, see Ptp.ri-Cokz Bouling Co. v. 
Hant!J, No. 1973-5, 2000 WL 364199 (Del. Ch. Mar. 15, 2000) emphasizing that the liability protection for 
• 
members will not be in force until the LLC is properly for1ned. In addition, members must be cautious to 
take appropriate actions to preserve their limited liability status upon dissolution of an entity. For an 
example of a situation where a fornter member of an LLC was held liable for a debt, see New H~ons Suppfy 
Cooperalivt v. H~JJUk, 590 N.W.2d 282 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999). Outside the scope of this article is the issue of 
what liability members and managers owe to the other rr•embers of the LLC. Su gett4fal{y Richard A. Booth, 
Fiduciary .Du!J1, Contrad and Wai.vtr in Parlnerships and LimiJed Liability . , 1 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. 
L 55 ( 1997); Fuentes, supra note II, at I 023 (considering the liability issue under Delaware and New York 
statutes). 
30. Robert B. Thompson, Th Limits of liabilily u1 1M New Limiltd ~ Enhliu, 32 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 1 , 14 ( 1997). 
31. /d. at 14. In addition, the language used to describe the coverage varies with the mosl common 
phrase, including the word "solely,,. to define the limitation on liability. ld. Similar to corporations, 
members may have certain liabilities to the LLC itself. Su Harvey Gelb, l.UJIJiliJia of Mmalms and Mano,ers 
of ~oming Limiled ~ Companin, 31 LAND & WATER L. REV. 133, 137 {1996) (analyzing one state 
statute). Under state statutes, members can be held liable: for contributions to the LLC that have been listed 
as made or scheduled to be made in the future. If a mernber receives a return of capital, under some state 
statutory provisions, such member may be liable for the equivaJent sum if it is needed to discharge certain 
liabilities of specified creditors. ld. at 138. Set also Ptpsi-Cola Bottling Co., 2000 WL 364199, at *5 (discussing 
the impact of improper distribution). Members not acting under an authorized LLC (due to the involuntary 
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and managers ofLLCs will not be able to shield themselves from claims 
relatin8 to theirpersonal conduct outside the scope of their roles in such 
LLCs,3 · 
The shield of limited liability that is created by individual state 
provisions for LLPs can also vary significandy. Many states have 
adopted an approach that will shield LLP partners from liabilities, debts 
or obligations incurred by the entity arising from the negligence, 
malpractice, wrongful act or misconduct committed by anotherpartner, 
employee or agent of the partnership~ 33 A partner's own negligence, 
malpractice, wrongful act or misconduct (or some_one under his or her 
direct supervision) may be excluded from the limited liability shield.34 
The trend appears to be to provide for a greater shield of protection in 
LLPs - similar to the limited liability shield found in LLCs. 35 The 
narrower scope of liability protection allowed under LLP provisions 
versus .LLC provisions may be partially explained by the expected use 
of LLPs primarily by professionals, where it would be a violation of the 
professional's rules of conduct to allow a person to limit the scope ofhis 
or her malpractice.36 
• 
dissolution of the entity, for example) are likely lo be held jointly and severally liable for all debts and 
liabilities of the entity. Gelb, supra, atl39. One advantage of most LLC statutes is that unlike LLP limited 
liability provisionst LLC statutes generally are structured similarly to corporation statutes that provide for 
retroactive limited liability protection for the entity's interest holders when 1he members_ take necessary steps 
to cure an issue such as administrative dissolution. 
32. Karin Schwindt, Limiled Liabili; Companw: Issues V. Member Iia/rili-9, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1541, 
J 548 ( 1997). There have been situations in which officers of companies are held liable for actions taken 
within the course of their employment. Liability for fraud related to the Medicare system has recently caused 
officers in health care companies concern. Margaret G-raham Tebo, Gui/&·1!1 Reason l![Thle, 86 A.B.A.J. 44, 
44 (May 2000). There is also the possibility that corporate officers will be held personally liable for patent 
infringement. Joseph M. Sauer, A Tear in IN C"'fKWal6 Veil: 1M Liabilig of Corporau 0./foers for Patent 
lnfiingernmt, 37 DUQ, L. REV. 89 ( 1998). The application _of corporate-type agency law to impose personal 
liability on members of LLCs is another area that has not yet been significantly developed. It has been 
• 
argued, and there is some limited case law supponing the proposition, that LLC members should be treated 
similarly to officers, directors and shareholders of corporations in this cont,ext. Kendal R. Hoopes, Note, 
Corporalions - Mtl~Ulps and Mmalms of Iimiled Li4lnlig CompilnW Wtll be H11d lo Ccrpqrall Ag~ and Personal 
liobilig Principles, Water. Waste, & Land, Inc. v. Lanham, 955 P.2d 997 (Colo. 1998), 34 LAND & WATER L. 
REV. 463, 470 (1999). In these cases, the couns appear to apply common law agency principles to the 
activities of the members, regardless of statutory provisions relating to the limited liabilityofthe LLC. Unlike 
the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil (where application of the doctrine will always be to the detriment 
ofthe member), the application of agency principles can benefit members of an LLC. Under general agency 
principles, the principal (in .this case the LLC itself) will be liable for the agreement contracted on its behalf. 
ld. at n.94. 
33. Hester, _supra note I 2, § 2. 
34. /d. This liability coverage is sometimes referred to as a "partial shield." Jd. The use ofpartial 
shield coverage is on the decline. 
35. ld. Twenty-two states phJ$ the District of Columbia have expand~d protection in their 'LLP 
statutes. /d. Sometimes this liability coverage is referred to as_ ''full .. shield" liability. S, id. The NCCUSL 
also took this approach in the Uniforn1 Umited Uability Partnership Act. ld. 
36.- Sel supra notes 12 and 27. 
• 
# 
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II. THEORIES OF 'LIMITED I~IABIUTY 
• 
For purposes of this paper, "limited liability, refers to the ability of a 
shareholder of a corporation or interest holder of a LLE to risk only the 
capital that such individual invests ir1to the entity.37 Some commenta-
tors view limited liability as a privilege provided to interest holders by 
states that allow for the form.ation of these entities under corporate and 
other entity codes. 38 Others view limited liability as just one more 
contractual tertn among creditors and owners.39 The theories support-
ing limited liability can be organized into arguments based on demo-
cratic ·principles arid arguments based on economic principles. 40 There 
has been more emphasis in recent decades on the economic arguments 
supporting limited liability, but in order to understand the historical 
basis of limited liability, it is necessary to also briefly consider the 
democratic justifications for limited liability. 41 Though the commentary 
in this area has primarily related to corporations, the analysis can be 
applied to all entities that have limited liability protection. 
A. The Democratic Tlzeory of Limited Liabili!J 
. ... 
It is difficult to determine the exact scope of limited liability for U.S. 
shareholders in the eighteenth century, but the general rule in the early 
nineteenth century was that shareholders had unlimited liability.42 The 
imposition of unlimited liability on shareholders was based on the belief 
that creditors would not extend necessary capital to manufacturing and 
3'7. Theresa A. Gabaldon, '17141..emtmade Stand: Feminist and Oilier &jkelions onlh4limiled LiiJJJiJi!7 of 
CorpliTale Shareholders, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1387, 1394 (1992). Ste Robert W. Hillman, Limiled liabili!Y in 
Hirtorical PersjJ«tWe, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 615 ( 1997) (detailing various periods, beginning with Roman 
law, in the development of law and commerce where there have been efforts to limit liability}. 
3_8. Larry E. Ribstein, LimiJed IJabili!y. and ~ of IJu CorporaJian, 50 Mo. L. REV. 80, 81 ( 1991 ). 
39. /d. at82. 
40. Although the arguments in t.his paper are divided into democratic and economic principles, some 
theories in these two arguments overlap. 
41. As imponant as economic_ models are to explain limited liability, Professor Thompson has stated 
that the principles "undoubtedly ... do not capture fully the entire benefit of limited liability.'• Thompson, 
supra note 4, at 22-23. Professor Thompson continues by stating that "the continued judicial preference for 
limited liability in corporate groups ... may refiect a society·widejudgment that \he benefits of limited 
liability exceed its costs.,, /d. at 23. 
42. STEPHEN 8. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL§ 1.03 (1991) (looseleaf). See also 
BLUMBERO, supra note 5, § 1.04.1 and § 1.04.4 (describing the emergence of limited liability); Mark I. 
Weinstein, limiled ~in C~ifomio.: 1928-1931, in SOC. SCI. RES. NE1WORK ELECTRONIC LJBR. (Sept. 
15, 2000), m http:/ I papers.ssm.com/ sol3/ papers.f rrn?cfid=3 10 186&cftoken= 1273033&abstract_id= 
244333' (analyzing the economic effect of moving to a limited liability system in California). 
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industrial concerns without this security.43 This view changed with time, 
and by the 1840s most state legislatures had adopted provisions that 
provided shareholders limited liability protection.# Commentators 
• 
discussing the democratic theory of limited liability often refer to this 
historical development of corporate codes in the nineteenth century as 
the event that triggered the almost universal adoption of provisions 
·providing limited liability to shareholders. 45 The idea behind the limited 
liability provisions was that persons of modest means would be encour-
aged to act in an entrepreneurial manner. 46 In addition, it was believed 
that entry into business markets would be more competitive iflimited 
liability for shareholders was the general rule.47 
B. Vze Economic Theory of Limittd Liabili~ 
A commonly cited rationale for allowing limited liability for entities_ 
based on economic principles is described by Frank H. Easterbrook and 
Daniel R. Fischel in their book, The Economic Structure of Corporate 1Aw.48· 
Easterbrook and Fischel analyze the relationship between limited 
liability and the theory of the firm.49 This theory advances the idea that 
limited liability re_duces_ the costs that _arise due to the separation of 
agents and owners of capital and the specialization inherent in corpora-
• 
• I 
• 
43. PRESSER, .supra note 42, § 1.03·. 
44. Jtl. An exception to the general rule providing limited liability protection to shareholders was 
applied to most bank shareholders who were subject to a double liability system (initial investment in entity 
plus the par value of the stock) until the imposition of a federal system of deposit insurance in 1933. Lissa 
'Lamkin Broome, Redisltibuling Bank ln.solvemy Risks: · · . to Limiutl/iabiJi!y in lht Bank Holding Compf11!1 
ShuttuYe~ 26 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 935, 941 (l993). There were attempts to revive unlimited liability in some 
states, but they ultimately failed. BLUMBERG, supra note 5, § 1.04.6. 
45. Stephen B. Presse.r, . · . 1M Calling oftlu Corporalion.· LimiJed I.iabili9, Dmw.crlJ9 and.Economics, 
97 .Nw. U. L. REV. 148,_ 155 ( 1992). Limited liability for corporate shareholders was not the universal view, 
and debate and pockets of liability continued into the twentieth century. Gabaldon, supra note 37, at 1397. 
Sa also BLUMBERG, supra note 5, § 2.0 I (discussing the survival of shareholder liability in specified situations 
including double liability for shareholders generally, pro rata liability in California and shareholder liability 
for wage claims). 
46. Presser; supra note 45, at 155. One way ·to bridge the democratic and economic arguments is to 
consider the fact that small businesses create most of the new jobs in the U.S. According to the U.S. Small 
Business Administration, small businesses provide about 7 5°/o of the net new jobs. Office of Advocacy, U.S. 
' 
Small Business Administration, aJ http://www.sba.gov/advo/stats/sbfaq.hunl Oast visited Feb. 12, 2001). 
Without limited liability protection some people with limited means may not start or expand these businesses. 
4 7. Presser, supra note 45, at I 55. 
48. ..W FRANK H. EAsTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL., THE ECONOMIC STRUCfURE OF 
CORPORATELAW (19_91). S, also BLUMB.ERG, supra note. 5, §§ 4.01-4.04. 
49. Sa EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 48·, at 4]. Professors Easterbrook and Fischel also 
. 
discuss the connection between limited liability and the cost of capital to the finn. &e id. at 41-47. 
, 
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tions. 50 Easterbrook and Fischel's clis(;ussion raises several issues that are 
impacted by limited Iiability:51 
A. Monitoring Costs. Limited liability will reduce monitoring costs for 
• 
investors. Investors monitor their ag·ents to a greater degree the more 
risk they bear. 52 By reducing the amount of risk to investors, investors 
will expend fewer resources on the mc,nitoring ofagents. If an unlimited 
liability structure is used, investors will also need to expend resources to 
monitor other interest holders. 53 
B. Market Benefits. With limite':i liability, shares in entities are 
homogeneous commodities and ca11 reflect a single market -price.54 
Allowing all investors to trade on the same terrns, the price of the shares 
is based on all available inforrnation about the entity. 55 By facilitating 
the free transferability of shares and pricing of shares (accordin,g to all 
available information), a limited liability system supports market 
informational efficiency. 56 U-sing this analysis, entities can also benefit 
from a lower cost of capital. 57 
C. Management Eificieng. Limited liability and the increased transfer-
ability of shares provide incentives for managers to act efficiendy.58 'If 
individual interest holders can sell their shares, it is possible for the · 
50. /d. 
51. Stl also BLUMBERG~ supra note 5, §§ 4.02, 4.0~i (discussing many of-these same costs as theoretical 
advantages and disadvantages of limited liability). Bul s~w Richard A. Booth, l.imiwJ Liabi1i!J and#& Ejfinml 
Al/ocalion oJResour,,es, 89 NW. U. L. REV.I40, 147 (1994) (arguing why the economic arguments set forth by 
Professors wterbrook and Fischel should fail). Professo•· Booth also raises additional arguments supponing 
limited liability but finds that they ultimately fail as well. ld. at 149. In suppon of limited liability, Professor 
Booth discusses the imponance of limited liability's role as a contracting device shifting the burden of 
negotiation. for personal liability to creditors. Jd. at 151 • 
52. EASTERBROOK&. FISCHEL, mpra note 48, at 41, 42. Monitoring agents will be limited to the risk 
that an investor has in the firrn. Monitoring shareholders under limited liability will be limited, as the 
individual wealth ·of the other shareholders does not impact the probability that a particular shareholder will 
. . ' 
be required to pay off a judgment. ld. 
• 
53. /d. at 42. 
54. ld. at 43. Shares in this discussion would also refer to other types of ownership interests, such as 
partnership or limited, liability company interests. 
55. /d .. 
• 
56. Ribstein, supra note 38, at 99. In order to accept that limited liability supports market efficiency, 
it is necessary to accept the theory known as the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis (ECMH), which holds 
in varying degrees that securities prices reflect all available infornlation. The weak venion of ECMH holds 
that past price information is not predictive of future price movements. The semi-strong version ofECMH 
provides that all p.ublicly available infonnation is quickly reflected in the market price of the security. Under 
the strong version of ECMH, all inforanation, even non-public inforanation, is reRected in the market price 
of securities. WIWAM A. KLEIN &jOHN C. COFFEEJR~, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE, LEGAL 
AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPI.ES 395 (2000). 
57. Ribstein, supra note 38, at I 00 (arguing that efficient market pricing reduces a firn,,s cost of capital 
because of lower investor information costs). 
58. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 48; at 42. If investors are able to ;s.eiJ their interests, 
existing managers in poorly-run fi rrns can be displaced by investors who assemble a voting majority to install 
new managerial teams. ld. 
• 
• 
• 
•' 
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management team to be replaced when new investors install their own 
managerial choices. 59 · 
D. Supports Diversification. Limited liability allows for a. more efficient 
diversification of investors' portfolios.60 Under an uruimited liability 
regime, investors would reduce the number of investments to minimize 
the risk of losing their individual wealth due to a claim against one of the 
• 
companies. 
E. Investment Benefits. Finally, limited liability protection aids 
management in.making optimal decisions on investments.61 Managers 
can invest in any project with positive net present value, including 
higher risk ventures, because investors will not lose more than their 
investment if such project fails. 62 
Support for an economic justification for limited liability is based on · 
the premise that there is not a simple shifting of loss from interest 
holders to creditors, b·utinstead there is a change in behavior due to the 
limited liability status o( interest holders.63 In addition, there is an 
argument that even if there was a 1 00°/o shift in loss, voluntary creditors 
possess a comparative advantage over interest holders because of their 
ability to monitor at least some ofan entity's managerial activities.64 If 
interest holders are granted limited liability protection, creditors and 
interest holders can be viewed as engaging in a risk sharing arrange-
ment.65 
The economic benefits concurrent with limited liability appear to be 
reduced if an entity is closely held, due to the lack of separation between 
management and the risk bearers. Due to the close relationship 
between the management and interest holders, there is no cost savings 
in connection with the monitoring of agents, and because many closely 
held entities restrict the transfer ofinterests, the capital markets may not 
reflect the limited liability advantage. 66 
59. ld. 
60. ld. al43. Investors can cut risk by holding a diversified portfolio of assets. Jd. If limited liability 
was not available, investors would be more likely to only invest in a few entities and there would be a 
variance in share valuation based not on the inherent value of the entity but on the personal wealth of the 
shareholder. Gabaldon, supra note 37, at 1405. 
61. EASTERBROOK 8t FISCHEL, supra note 48, at 43~ Professors Easterbrook and Fischel recognize 
that the cost savings due to limited liability can .be -significandy reduced in close corporations; and they 
discuss the use of the doctrine of piercing the corporate -veil to illustrate this distinction. /d. at 55. 
62. ld. at44. Investments in projects with positive net present values are considered beneficial uses 
of capital. ld. With ponfolio diversification, investors are also able to hedge againS,t the risk of one project 
failing. ld. 
63. ld. at 45. 
64. ld. at46. 
65. Creditors often require interest holders to provide personal guarantees or security in order lo 
manage this risk. · 
66. EASTERBROOK&. FISCHEL, supra note 48,- at 56. 
·, 
• 
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Some commentators disagree with the view that limited liability for 
closely held entities is less justified!! ti? These commentators emphasize 
the ability of parties in closely held companies to diversify investments 
and bear loss. 68 An argument can be made that by using venture capital 
and debt, a closely held entity can ttave significant separation between 
management and risk bearers, thereby causing the participants in such 
an entity to act more like· their ptlblic entity countexparts and thus 
gaining the ability to apply the cost savings of limited liability in a 
similar fashion. 
Theoretically, entities that have limited liability protection are more 
likely to have insufficient assets a\"ailable to pay credi~ors' claims.69 
Some. commentators· have proposed reducing or even eliminating 
limited liability coverage. 70 Supporting these proposals is the theory that 
limited liability creates a_ moral hazard because interest holders are_ able 
to receive all the benefits of risky activities without all the costs.71 
Proponents of limited liability recognize that this externality of risk may 
impose undesirable social costs, but they minimize the magnitude of risk 
extemalization. and do not accept the premise that abolishing limited 
liability would reduce the moral hazard.72 Commentators advocating 
a change in the limited liability status of interest holders generally 
propose alternative liability rules, including pro rata liability. These 
arguments focus on the inefficiencies created by limited liability, such as 
67. E.g., David W. Leebron,JimiluJLiabili!Y, TorJ Yaclims, andCredilors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565, 1626 
( 1991 ). See also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note: 48. at 55 (discussing the distinction between close 
versus publicly held corporations). 
68. E.g., Leebron,supra note 67, _at 1626 .. Even ifdosely held cprporation shareholders are granted 
limited liability, Professor ~ebron would subject the grant to three constraints, including the requirement 
that shareholders/managers of closely held corporations have an obligation to provide adequate insurance 
to cover claims of forese~able tort victims. I d. at 1636. ty.: Ribstein, supra note 38, at I 0 1. Professor Ribstein 
discusses the benefits of limited liability to closely held <:om parties ·and argues that limited liability serves an 
important function in closely held firms. Jd. at I 06. 
69. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 48, at 49. See also BLUMBERG, mpra note 5, § 4.03 el seq. 
(discussing theoretical disadvantages to limited liability, including the distinction between tort and contract 
creditors). 
70. E.g~, Henry Hansmann &. Reinier Kraakman, Towatd Unlimited Shore/wider LiabiJi!1 jM Corptwau 
Torts, I 00 YALE LJ. 1879, 1932-34 ( 1991 ). But see Michael P. Coffey, In Defense. of Limited Liabili!Y- A Rep~ 
to Hansmann and Krllllhnan, 1 GEo. MASON L. REV. 59 (1994). Set also janet Cooper Alexander, Unlimiled 
Share/wider LiaiJili!y Througla a Procedural Lens, 106 HARV~ L. REV •. 387 (1992) (arguing that Hansmann and 
Kraakman underestimate the proced.._rat _obstacles to their proposal to eliminate limited liability for tort 
claims); but if. Hansmann &Kraakman,A Procedural Focus on Unlitniled$kareh.older lialiil~, JOG HARV. L. REV. 
446 (responding to Alexander's anicle). See also Joseph A. Grundfest, 1M l.imikd Future ofUnlimi.Jed Liahili!J: 
A Capilal Markets PerspeciWe, 102 YALELJ. 387 (1992) (a defense oflimited liability);. bul cf. Henry Hansmann 
_& Reiniet Kraakman, Do lite CapiJal Markas CompellimillJ Uo.bil~? A Response to Pr'!fessor Grundfest, I 02 YALE 
LJ. 427 (1992) (response to Grundfest's article). 
7 1. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 48, at 50. 
' 
72. ld. The externality of risk can be, limited to involuntary creditors. /d. 
• 
. 
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incentives to "misinvest'' by aver-investing in hazardous industries and 
under-investing in precautionary ones. 73 Some commentators who 
propose eliminating limited liability in tort may not extend these 
arguments to contract claims.74 The basis for retaining limited liability 
for interest holders in contract claims is that the parties have already 
efficiendy allocated the risks of the transaction.75 One way that.courts 
have resolved the potential problems relating to limited liability is by 
invoking the doctrine of veil piercing to impose unlimited liability in 
individual cases. 76 . 
Ill. THE DOCTRINE OF PIERCING THE VEIL 
• 
Regardless of the innovative proposals of some commentators, the 
ability of investors to choose an entity with limited liability protection 
appears to be firmly entrenche-d in U.-S~ law.77 There have _always been 
exceptions to this general rule regarding limited liability, including the 
liability of shareholders for failure to pay full consideration for their 
shares and, in certain cases, liability for debts to corporate employees. 78 
The courts' ability to pierce the veil of an entity· is based on their 
general authority to apply equitable principles.79 Although co_urts use 
a variety of methods to determine when piercing is appropriate, the 
result is that an entity's shield of limited liability protection is disre-
garded to reach an individual interest holder's assets when such result 
is deemed to be in the interest of "fairness. , 80 In such cases, the actions 
(or inactions) of an interest holder result in the removal of the shield of 
limited liability and allow creditors to access such interest holder,s_ assets . 
• 
. 
· 7 3. Hansmann & Kraakman, Towatd Unlimited SluzrJ.oltkr Liabili9 for Corptwau Torts, supra note 70, at 
1882~85. 
74. E.g., id. at 1919. Thus, even if Professors Hansmann and Kraakman and oilier proponents of 
eliminating limited liability in tort claims were successful in changing this rule, limited liability for contractual 
claims and the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil (as it ,applies to contract claims) would remain a tool 
for courts to use as necessary. Sa itifra notes 77-161 and accompanying text (discussing piercing the veil). 
75. /d. 
76. Coffey, supra note 70, at 73. 
77. See Leebron, supra note 67, at 1566. "[F]ew topics are liable to strike the reader as less likely to 
produce changes in the law than an analysis of limited liabifity. No principle seems more established in 
capitalist law or more essential to the functioning of the modem corporate economy!' ld. (citations omitted). 
78. PRESSER, supra note 1-2, § 1.0 I. Su also KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 56, at I 39. . 
79. The legal basis for courts piercing the veil is obscure. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 48,_ 
at 54. 
80. Veil piercing is commonly used to reach the assets of individual interest holders. Creditors may 
reach the assets of "siste·r" corporations through what is sometimes referred to as a process of "reverse 
piercing., This can be teferred to as "enterprise liability." The_ veil piercing doctrine is also known as the 
doctrine of corporate disregard. · 
• 
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The question of whether to apply the doctrine of piercing the veil to 
. . 
new forms of LLEs in the same manner as it is applied to corporations 
is complicated by the lack of uniformity in the application of the theory 
to corporations themselves. A descriJ>tion of the various "rules." relating 
to the doctrine of piercing the veil is difficult to define because of the 
seemingly random manner in which courts have applied the doctrine. 
Commentators have described the rationale for piercing the veil as 
vague and illusory and application of the doctrine itself as "~]ike 
lightning . . . rare, severe, and unprincipled."81 Perhaps the only 
common element among piercing cases is that there; must be an 
und.erlying claim against the entity. 82 
Several theories relate to the development of the veil piercing 
doctrine. 83 It is not surprising that cornmentators are unable to agree on 
the historical underpinnings of the doctrine, given that there is no 
consensus among commentators and the courts as to which situations 
the doctrine should be applied.84 Theories relating to veil piercing 
historically have utilized broad and intuitive approaches to articulate the 
proper circumstances for the doctrine's application~85 One theory 
. 
81. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limiled liabi/i9and tltl Corporation; 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 
89, 89 (1985) . ..W also PRESSER, supra note 42, § 1.0 I. Other descriptions of piercing the corporate veil cases 
illustrate the confusion in the area. s-, e.g., Robert B. Thompson, Pier&inglll4 Corpora/4 Ytil: An EmpitUal Stut!J; 
76 CORNEU.. L. RE.V. 1036, 1037 (1991). One of.the most frequently cited opinions describing this lack of 
unifom--.ity was written by Judge Cardozo in -~ v. 11tirdA~ Railuxg Co., 155 N.E. 58,61 (N.Y. 1926) 
(describing the veil piercing doctrine as being "enveloped in the mists of metaphor,). Examples of the 
citation of the Cardozo opinion include Carsten Alting; Piercing ~ Corpora~~ Veil in Ameriean and Gtmum Lmv 
- liobi/i!1 of Individuals and Enlilies: A ComparalilJI Yaezv, 2 TUI.SAJ. COMP. & INT'L L. I 87, 193 (1995) and 
Sandra K. Miller,. Pimi.ttg 1M CopottJJe Vtil Anumg A.JlilU*d . in the European Communf9 and in 1M U.S.: 
A Comparativt Arza!ysis of U.S., German, and U.K. Veii-PiercingApjwrxl&lw, 36 AM. Bus. LJ. 73, 77 (1998). 
82. As Professor Clark states, "cases attempting to pierce the corporate veil are unified more by the 
remedy sought subjecting to. corporateJiabilities the personal assets directly held by shareholders ·than 
by repeated and consistent application of the same criteria for ·granting the remedy.'' Robert Charles Clark,. 
1M DuiW oflhe Corparale Debtor lo its Crdilors, 90 HARV. I... REV. 505, 541 (1977). 
83~ ·~ PRESSER, supra note 42, § 1.02. h is imponant to note that other than the references to the 
application of the-doctrine of piercing the corporate-veil to U..Cs (and to a lessor extent I .I.Ps), it is unusual 
to have any statutory basis for the application of this doctrine. This stands in contrast to the universal use 
of language in statutes providing for limited liability protection of shareholders. An exception to this general 
rule is in the Texas Business Corporation Act provision that sets out .. the circumstances under which 
shareholders will be liable. See TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. an. 2.21 (West, WESTLA W through 1999 Reg. 
Sess.). Sa also Thompson, supra note 81, at 1042. 
84. The tenn "piercing the veil" has been traced to a 1912 article by Professor Wormser. Alting, 
supra note 81, at 192 (citing l. Maurice Worrnser, ~f 1114 Veil of Ike Corporate~' 12 COLUM. L. REV. 
496 ( 1912)). The. application of the do.ctrine is not .confined to .the. United States. Many:other countries have 
developed similar theories. Jose .Engracia Antunes. TAe liabili~ oJPolycorporalt. EnlerfnirtS, 13 CONN.J. INT'L 
L. 197, 215 (1999). -~ also Proceedings Fourtla Annual · Business lAw Symposium: Ml · · 
Corporalions and Cross Border Confols: .Naliotudi!J, Veil &dng and Sut:cusor Liahilig, 10 FLA.j. INT'L L. 221 
(1995). 
85. PRESSER, supra note 42, § 1 ~03 [ 4] (contrasting two broad and intuitive approaches with Frederick 
Powell's three-pronged test). 
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buttressing the courts' ability to pierce the veil is the purported 
. . 
perversion of the co orate privilege based on the state's allowance of 
the law and economic arguments relating the app.ropriate uses (and non-
uses) of the piercing doctrine have developed in recent decades.87 
A. 11lelnes in Veil Piercing • 
Each state (and sometimes even an individual court within a state) has 
a different view on the appropriate circumstances for piercing the veil. 88 
Legal scholarship has attempted to determine the decisional structure 
of the cases and has developed some common themes. Perhaps the 
most widely held belief is that it is easier to pierce the veil in a case 
involving a tort creditor versus a contract creditor.89 In court opinions 
that adopt this distinction, it is considered equitable to provide more 
protection for the tort creditor, who generally does not choose to do 
business with the tortfeasor, than for a contract creditor, who has the 
capacity to negotiate for protection prior to entering into a relationship 
with an entity. 90 It is possible for contract creditors to obtain personal 
guarantees from interest holders or increase their costs when dealing 
with entities with limited liability protection.91 
Another common theme is that piercing occurs in· situations where 
there is a parent-subsidiary relationship.92 One theoretical foundation 
for piercing in a parent-subsidiary relationship is based on the doctrine 
of agency where the parent acts as a principal and the subsidiary as its 
agent.93 It is more common, however, for a court to find that a creditor 
need simply show that the parent company exercised control over the 
subsidiary in order to pierce the subsidiary's veil.94 One study showed 
. . . 
86. /d. § 1.02. 
87. ld. § 1.04 . 
. 88. Su also infra note 158 (discussing piercing by federal courts). 
89. Professor Thompson's s~udy found that this belief is empirically unfounded. Thompson, supra 
note 81, at I 058·59; Thompson, supra note 4, at 23-4. 
90. PRESSER, supra note 42, § 1.05[3]. Professor Presser suggests that courts ought to pierce less 
frequently in contract cases and cites several jurisdictions in which that theory appears to have gained 
acceptance. Presser, supra note 45, at 168. The distinction between voluntary and involuntary creditors is 
one that has also been analyzed in connection with priorities in bankruptcy. Su in.fta notes 212 .. 221 and 
• accompany1ng text. 
' 91. Cohen• Whelan, supra note 8, at 356. 
92. See Thompson, supra note 81; at 1047. Professor Thompson's study did not find a single case 
where piercing occurred in a publicly held corporation. Stl id. 
93. PRESSER, supra note 42, § 1.05(4]. 
94. Miller, supra note 81, at 80. Professor Miller also states that such control must be accompanied 
by fraudulent; illegal or other improper conduct that creates an injustice. Iii. This 1ype of conduct is 
described in the factors di~ussed in notes 1 02, I 03 and accompanying text. 
• 
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that a court is more likely to pierce the veil if an individual, rather than 
another entity, is to be liable.,95 Case law tends to treat piercing against 
individuals and entities the same, so it is difficult to analyze why 
individuals are more likely to be impacted by the doctrine-. The higher 
level of legal sophistication .in companies, with multiple entities may 
seiVe to protect against the application of.some of the factors that courts 
apply, specifically the lack of corpora.te formalities. In addition, courts 
may also consider the multiple roles of some individuals as employees of 
the parent as well as the subsidiary entity. It is difficult to deterrnine in 
this context whether such personnel were acting within the scope of 
their employment for the parent or fbrthe subsidiary.96 
A final general theme is that application of the doctrine s,eems to be 
limited to entities that are closely held. An empirical study that 
reviewed 16'00 cases from the 1960s to 1990 did not find a single 
successful piercing case targeting a public corporation.97 It is clear that 
mere overlap ~f owners~ip in an enti~ roup, or interest owne?hip, will 
not be suffic1ent to pterce the ved .. 9 Regardless of the Increased 
likelihood of piercing in cqrporations with few or single shareholders, it 
is well established that there, are no grounds for per se piercing based on 
the closely held status of an entity.99 
These themes should have a ne11tral impact on LLEs, given the 
expansion in the. numbers and uses of these entities. Initially, it 
appeared that LLEs were, used primarily as· an alternative to S corpora-
tions, or general or limited p,artnerships, so there were some limitations 
on the complexity ofthe entity. Because the adoption ofLLE statutes 
by all ftfty states and the District of Columbia has resolved any possible 
issue of recognition ofLLEs, and the certainty of tax treatments ofLLCs 
has increased, these forms are being utilized by a wide range of actors, 
including joint ventures of large corporate organizations.100 Given that 
LLEs will likely be used for the sam.e reasons that corporations were 
95. Thompson, supra note 81, at 1038. 
96. Franklin A. Gevurtz, Piercing Piercint: An Alkmjll to Lifl• Veil of Cm..fosimt. Surrounding Ike Doctrinl 
of Piercing 1/tt Corporok Veil, 76 OR. L. REV. 853, 897-898 (1997l. 
97. Thompson, supra note 81, at 1047. 
98. ld. at 1071. 
99. Cf Gevurtz, supra note 96, at ,863 (discussing closely held corporations). Professor Thompson~s 
-study also found that it is more likely for piercing to occur as the number of shareholders decreases. 
Thompson, supra note 81, at 1054. 
100. Sa Nikhil Deogun &. Betsy McKay, Co& mad P&G Plan to Creou I 4.2 Billion Juict· and Snack 
Co.mpany, WAILST;j., Feb. 21, 2001, at BJ (formation <>flimited liability company to develop and market 
juices,juicc:-based drinks and snacks). In fact, there may be some disadvantages to using the LLC form with 
partnership tax treatment if the persons foraning the enti~y believe that they will be soliciting venture capital 
financing. Steven F. Carman, Venlurt-Ca/1 FtliUls EsclwJ lnoutmmls in UCs &Mjils ofllr4 UC Foma, Sue/a as Flow· 
Tlw.augh Taxalitm, ar:t of I.iJIU Value to Vm~ur, Funt!s, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 14, 1998, at B 13. 
• 
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, used in the past, it does not appear that the doctrine of veil piercing will 
be applied to LLEs in any greater or lesser degree as a result of these 
themes. 
B. Factors in Veil Piercing 
Courts tend to apply similar factors when analyzing the appropriate-
ness of veil piercing. 101 In addition to the factors listed below, it is 
common for courts to pierce the limited liability shield only if the entity 
has been used to . erpetuate a fraud or if a failure to pierce would 
of veil piercing, and although they can be viewed as separate concepts, 
courts tend to use the terms interchangeably when discussing this aspect 
of veil piercing~ The types of actions or behaviors that constitute fraud 
are not generally defined by the courts, although certain types of 
representations appear to arise frequendy in piercing cases involving 
contra_ct claims. These-representations can be broken down into three 
categories: (1) representations concerning the entity's financial status, 
• (2) representations relating to the entity's performance, and (3) represen-
tations that someone besides the entity will stand behind the debt. 103 
Courts commonly find that "failure to pierce would promote injustice" 
when supporting the piercing claims of tort creditors. Given the nalure 
ofLLEs and the policies supporting veil piercing, it would appear to be 
appropriate to pierce the veil ofLLEs only ifthis fraud factor is available 
or if there is a strong argument that failure to pierce would promote 
injustice. 104 In addition to this fraud/injustice aspect of piercing, courts 
also use non-fraud factors to analyze the appropriateness of veil 
piercing. These factors can be divided into three general categories: 
compliance with corporate formalities, undercapitalization and 
instrumentality or alter ego. 
1. Cotporate Forrnalities 
The first factor courts generally look to in determining whether to 
pierce the corporate veil is whether the entity followed formalities and 
I 0 I. Professor Gevurtt refers to this use of factors as the "template" approach. Gevurtz, supra note 
96, at 856. Professor Gevurtz also discusses judicial holdings that explain their decision to pierce by using 
perjorative reasoning or a character test. /d. at 855. -· 
102. /d. at 871·873. 
I 03. Id. 
I 04. Set infra Par·t IV and accompanying notes (discussing alternatives to the common law system that 
may more consistently accomplish the policy goals of veil piercing). 
• 
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kept adequate records of its business. An example of this typ,e of 
conduct is the failure to have or n1aintain records of shareholder or 
director meetings. 105 Critics say that it is inappropriate for courts to use 
this factor to pierce the veil in the corporate context because there is no 
connection between the conduct (failing to keep records) and the wrong 
leading to the piercing. 106 One way to consider this issue is to determine 
why legislatures include certain formality requirements in corporate 
codes. Although there are certainly provisions in modern corporate 
codes that are intended to protect creditors, such as restrictions on the 
issuance of dividends, many corporate fortnalities cited by courts are 
clearly intended to protect shareholders. 107 The argument supporting 
the application of this factor in v~!il piercing is that record-keeping 
formalities assist in determining the conduct of shareholders and the 
corporation at the time the cause of action arose,.108 
The application of this factor in the LLE context is especi~lly 
problematic given the flexibility LLE provisions have relating to entity 
formalities. Unlike in the development of the shareholder protections 
in corporate codes, itappears improlbable, at least in the short term, that 
states will amend their LLC statutes in a manner that would remove the 
flexibility of members to choose the formalities the entities must 
follow. tog Considerin,g the languag~~ in state statutes that addresses the 
application of this factor to LLCs, the significant freedom LLCs have to 
set the level of formalities and the questionable utility of this factor in the 
corporate context, courts should refrain from using this factor to pierce 
the veil of an LLC. 110 I .. I .. Ps are also not required to engage in actions 
similar to cotporate forrnalities, and this factor would appear to be 
equally, irrelevant if-a court is considering piercing the veil of an LLP. 111 
• 
105. Cevurtz, supra note 96, at 867. 
106. ld, Some commentators have criticized the use of this factor as being theoretically unsound .. 
Professor Thompson's study found ,the use of this factor C\8 less important than other factors that have a more 
substantive impact on an entity's status. Thompson, sUpra note 81, at 1067. 
107. Cevurtz, supra note 96, at 870. An example or a corporate formality intended to protect 
shareholders is the requirement of annual shareholders meetings for the purpose of electing directors~ 
I 08. /d. at 879. · 
109. One of the perceived advantages to LLCs is the ability of the members to eliminate these types 
of fonnalities. Su su.pra note 21. 
110. Carter G. Bishop, Unworport&d Limited Lit.rbili!J Bwinlss Organil;ations: Limiled LUzbilf.9 Companies 
and Partnerships, 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 985, 1036 (I 995) (stating that in the case of Massachusetts LLCs, 
the "failure to observe the usual company fornlalities should not constitute a ground for piercing the liability 
. . . . 
shield because an LLC may often be a small and info1mal operation''). 
Ill. I d. at I 026. When discussing the ~pplication of veil piercing to LLPs, Professor Bishop asserts 
that. due to the fundamental differences between full-shield Massachusetts I,J.Ps and corporations; there 
should be modifications, in the application of the doctrine. /d. 
• 
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2. Undercapitalization 
So~e courts also consider undercapitalization of the entity to be an 
important factor in the application of the doctrine of veil piercing. 112 
The extent to which courts utilize this factor is in part dependent on 
whether the court considers the ability of individuals to form entities 
with limited liability protection to be a privilege granted by the state or 
merely the result of a contractual relationship. 113 If a court adopts the 
privilege theory, it is likely that it will give more· weight to the 
undercapitalization factor, as an argument can be made that the ''spirit" 
of the privilege is abused when the entity does not act in the public's 
interest. 114 In contrast, if the contractual relationship theory is used to 
· · support the establishment of a corporation, it is less likely that the court 
will consider undercapitalization to be a significant factor. 115 Under this 
theory, states should have a limited role in determining adequate 
capitalization, as the ability to establish an entity with limited liability 
protection merely reflects a contractual relationship among the interest 
holders. 116 The state allows for this classification because such 
arrangements are viewed as an efficient way to provide support fo~ such 
contractual relationships. 117 
Unlike the factor of corporate formalities, it is possible to direcdy 
apply the undercapitalization factor to LLEs. 118 For all LLPs and LLCs 
that choose to be classified as partnerships, pass-through taxation gives 
them less incentive to maintain a capital resetve for later distribution. 119 
One challenge for courts is to determine what level of capitalization is 
sufficient, given the widely divergent needs of businesses and the 
inability to determine what level of risk a particular business operator 
should be willing to accept. 120 Although commentators have discussed 
theoretical tests for inadequate capitalization, it is difficult to formulate 
. 
J 12. Professor Thompson's study found that undercapitalization was cited less frequently than 
instrumentality and alter ego. Thompson, supra note 81, at I 063. lfinadequate capitalization is the primary 
factor supporting veil piercing, a more focused remedy would be to establish capitalization requirements to 
provide a minimum level of assets to be available for creditors. See in.fta notes 190 ... 206 and accompanying 
text. 
J J 3. 
114. 
I I 5. 
116. 
117. 
118. 
119. 
Eric Fox, Hert:ingiM Veil of Limited l.iabil~ Companw, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1143, 1159 (1994). 
PREssER, supra note 42, § I .02. 
Fox, supra note 113, at 1159. 
PREsSER, mpra note 42, § 1.02. 
I d. 
Cohen-Whelan, supra note 8, at 35 7. 
I d. 
120. The cases are not at all clear on how to define inadequate capitalization. Gevurtz; supra note 96, 
at 888. Set also in.fta notes 190-206 and accompanying text (discussing minimum capitalization or insurance 
requirements as an alternative to the veil piercing doctrine). 
• 
( 
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a test that is able to take into account unexpected tort liabilities.121 If 
there are no minimum capitalization or insurance requirements for a 
particular business, it is problematic to bas_e the decision to pierce solely 
on underc_apitalization.122 Given the ability of contract creditors to 
determine the level of capitalization, or even to require a minimal level 
of capitalization, there is- a logical argument that this factor should only 
be applied in tort cases where the creditor does not have the opportunity 
to protect itself from the (in hindsight) unr~asonable risks that an entity 
takes if such entity is undercapitalized. 
-3. Instrumentality or Alter Ego 
The final general category of factors that courts consider in the 
context of veil piercing is whether one. entity treats another entity's assets 
as its own. This is refe_rred to as "instrumentality, or ''alter ego," and 
it relates to the control or domination of an ·entity by its interest 
holders.123 Proof of commingling of funds or assets may be used ·to 
illustrate the domination ofthe entity.124 The language used by courts 
to describe the control or domination behavior is varied and is used 
somewhat interc·hangeably. 125 Courts may encounter difficulties when 
applying this factor because there is a fine line between proper 
management and improper domination of an entity by its interest 
holders. 
The specific problem with applying this factor to I.I.Es is the fact that 
statutory previsions support flexibility in I,I,E management. 126 Some 
statutes specifically provide for decentralized management as a default 
121. Leebron, supra note 67, at 1635. 
l22. CJ Gewrtz, supra note 96~ at 882. Generally,. undercapitalization functions as just one of a 
. 
number of factors used as_ justification for piercing the corporate veil. In certain situations, however,: 
inadequate capitalization alone has been used as an independent g_round for piercing the corporate veit 
Leebron, supra note 67, at 1634. Historically, it w~ common for state codes to contain provisions relating 
to minimum levels of capital. Galbadon, supra note 37, at 1397. There are still some states that have 
minimum capital requirements; however, the amo~nt required is quite low. For example, the minimum 
capital requirement is SIOOO in Alaska and Texas. AK. STAT.§ 10~10.030 (State of Alaska and .Matthew 
Bender, WESTLA W through 3d Spec. Sess. of the Twenty-First Leg. (2000)); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 
art. 3.02 (West, WESTLAW through 1999 Reg. Scss.). In contrast, several states require minimum 
insurance or another fortn of security in order to lake advantage of LLP p.rovisions._ ~supra notes 26-28_ 
. . 
and accompanying text. 
123. Professor Gevunz has described this factor in connection with two multi-part tests,: each which 
contains an element of fraud. Gewrtz, supra note 96, at 1!62. 
124. /d. at 864. 
125. Miller, supra note 81, at 91. 
126. LLC statutes were spec:ifically established to allow for flexibility of the partnership management 
model with the advantage of limited liability. S. supra notes 22. 23 and accompanying text (discussing the 
management structures of LLCs) . 
• 
• 
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rule127 while others make- centralized management the default. 128 
Should the application of this factor depend on which management 
structure is selected by a state as the default rule? 129 The problen:t with 
any type of test using management structure as the dividing line is that 
in practice it is unlikely that the majority ofLLCs or LLPs will lie clearly 
on one side or the other of the spectrum. Interest holders are likely to 
take advantage of LLE provisions in part because they allow for a 
hybrid organizational structure. Certainly, just as in the cotporate 
context where_ shareholders may require supennajority voting for 
important decisions, interest holders are likely, even in a centrally 
managed entity, to acquire some role in the management and control 
of the LLE. Given this background relating to the passage of LLE 
provisions, any domination of the LLE management by the interest 
holders, absent other equitable issues, would appear to be an 
inappropriate factor for the courts to use to pierce the veil to the 
detriment of the interest holders. Perhaps application of this factor 
should not be based on how the entity is being run, but rather on the 
motivation behind the management of the entity. This would bring the 
discussion back to the factors that almost all courts consider - whether 
there has been fraud or whether failure to pierce would promote 
• • • lllJUStlce. 
C. Statutory lAnguage Relating to Piercing the Veil 
• 
Some state legislatures have adopted language indicating the 
anticipated use of the piercing doctrine against interest holders ofLLEs. 
Many state LLC statutes have -addressed the piercing issue specifically, 
with fewer states dealing with this issue in their LLP provisions. It is 
perhaps no surprise that most of the states that have dealt with the issue 
for LLPs have language in their LLC acts as well. States have taken 
d~fferent approaches to deal with veil piercing in their LLE acts. 130 
There is relatively little written legislative history for LLC and LLP 
provisions, so it is difficult to determine the issues that were considered 
in connection with veil piercing language, and the intent of legislatures 
in some cases may only be inferred. 
127. Cohen· Whelan, supra note 8, at 354. 
128. Fox~ supra note 113, at 1168. 
129., /d. at 1172. 
130. Given the rapid amendment of LLE provisions, this paper does not attempt to provide a 
comprehensive listing of all the states that fit within these categories but merely sets forth examples of some 
of the language used. For a listing of ll..P provisions, see 5 STATE LIMITED LIABIUTV COMPANY&. 
PARTNERSHIP LAWS (Michael A. Bamberger & Arthur J. Jacobson eds., 1995 ). 
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There are several categories of statutes that relate to veil piercing. 131 
In the first category are statutes that explicitly provide that the cotporate 
doctrine of veil piercing should apply to LLEs. 132 Minnesota's LLC 
statute exemplifies this category and provides that "case law that states 
the conditions and circumstances under which the veil of a corporation 
may be pierced under Minnesota law also applies to limited liability 
companies."133 . 
Other statutes specifically reference a particular factor courts may use 
in determining whether piercing is appropriate but do not explicitly 
reference the doct~ne. 134 This typ·e of language is reflected in the 
Unifotm Limited Liability Company Act (ULLCA) which states that 
"[t]he failure of a limited liability company to obse!Ve the usual 
company for1nalities or requirements relating to the exercise of its 
company powers or management of its business is not a ground for 
imposing personal liability on the me1nbers or managers for liabilities of 
the company." 135 Given that there would be no reason to discuss this 
131. For a chart listing various provisions relating to the liability of members. see I LARRY E. RtBSTEIN 
& ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON LIMITED LIABIU1Y COMPANIES app. 12·1 (West 
' Group 1995). 
· 132. For LLCs: CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 7-80-107 (West, WESTLA W through 2001 I st Reg. Sess.) 
("the court shall apply the case law which interprets the conditions and circumstances under which the 
corporate veil of a corporation may be pierced under Colorado law''); N.D. CENT. CODE § I 0-32-29 
(LEXIS through 1999 Reg. Sess.) ("[t)he case law that states the conditions and circumstances under which 
the corporate veil of a corporation may be pierced under North Dakota law also applies to limited liability 
companies"); WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 183.0304 (West, WESTLAW through 2001 Act 15, published 8/31/01) 
("nothing in this chapter shall preclude a court from ignoring the limited liability company entity under 
principles of common Ia w of this state that are similar to those applicable to business corporations and share-
holders in this state and under circumstances that are not inconsistent with the purposes of this chapter"). 
For U.Ps: COLO.REV.STAT.ANN. § 7-64-1009{West, WESTLA W through 2001 1st Reg. Sess.) 
(tracking the same language as the LLC statute but adding a provision clarifying that failure to observe the 
formalities or requirements relating to the management of its business is not in itSelf a ground for imposing 
personal liability on the partners for the debts of the I ,l.P); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 4.)..22-09 (LEXIS through 
1999 Reg. Sess.) (tracking the same language as the LLC statute and adding a provision stating that "(t]he 
use of informal procedures or arrangements for the management and for the conduct of business is not a 
ground for piercing the limited liability shield.,). 
133. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 3228.303 (West, WESTLA W through 2000 Reg. Sess.). See also the 
Minnesota I.I.P provision tracking the LLC language stating: "[C]ase law that states the conditions and 
circumstances under which the corporate veil of a corporation may be pierced under Minnesota law aJso 
applies to limited liability partnerships." MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 323.14 (West, WESTLA W through 2000 Reg. 
Sess.). 
134. Su LLCs: HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 428-303 (Matthew-Bender, WESTI.A W through 2000 Spec. 
Sess.); 805 IlL. COMP. STAT. ANN.§ 180/10-10 (West, WESTLAW through 2000 Reg. Sess.); MoNT. 
CODE ANN.§ 35-8-304 (WESTLAW through 2000 Spec. Sess.); OR. REV. STAT.§ 63.165 (WESTLAW 
through 1999 Reg. Sess.); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-44-303 (WESTLA W through 2000 Reg. Sess.); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 48-217 -I 0 1 (WESTLA W through 1999 R.eg. Sess.). 
135. ULLCA § 303(b) ( 1995). The comments following this section in the ULLCA do not discuss this 
subsection of the act. An interesting example of a statute that has been revised to utilize this type oflanguage 
is the West Virginia Code. An earlier version of the statute stated that members have "the same rights and 
liabilities as directors of corporations so organized or registered." W. VA. CODE § 3 1-1 A-33 (Michie 
• 
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factor absent the application of the doctrine, it is reasonable to infer that 
the legislature intended courts to apply the piercing doctrine with the 
modification provided in the statute. Some LLP provisions use similar 
language; however, unlike the ULLCA, the Uniform Limited Liability 
Partnership Act (UI.lJ>A) does not provide language relating to liability 
and formalities. 136 
In addition, there are provisions that do not specifically name the 
piercing doctrine or reference factors used in its application, but which 
include statements equating the liability shield of members and 
shareholders. In states with this type of statute, it is possible to infer that 
members should be treated the same as shareholders in situations where 
the veil piercing doctrine can be applied. 137 Some of these statutes 
combine references to the liability shield with a piercing factor. 
California law, for example, states that members will be held liable 
"under the same or similar circumstances and to the same extent as a 
shareholder of a corporation may be personally liable ... except that the 
failure to hold meetings of members or managers or the failure to 
observe forrnalities pertaining to the calling or conduct of meetings shall 
not be considered a factor tending to establish ... liability."138 
The final category involves statutes that lack any provision 
whatsoever related to veil piercing. The majority of states' LLE statutes 
fall into this category. 139 There are several ways to interpret the lack of 
a specific provision relating to veil piercing. The first is to consider the 
Butterworth, WESTLA W 1995). The current West Virginia act specifically references the failure to.observe 
corporate formalities. S. W.VA. CODE§ 31B-3-303(b) (Matthew Bender, WESTLAW through 2000 1st 
Exec. Sess.). 
136. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29- I 026{E) (Wesl, WESTLA W through 2000 2d Reg. Sess. 
and 5th Spec. Sess.) (Arizona partner liability provision). 
137. Schwindt, supra note 32, at 1554. 
138. CAL. CORP. CODE§ 1710J(b) (West, WESTLAW through 1999-2000 Reg. Sess~ and 1st Exec. 
Sess.). The statutory language relating to corporate foranalities will only apply where the articles of 
organization or operating agreement do not expressly require the holding of meetings of members or 
managers. S. al.ro WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 25. I 5.060 (West, WESTLA W through 2000 2d Spec. Sess.). 
139.· Klein, supra note 8, at 134 n.12. Note that there are LLC provisions that include special 
provisions relating to the personal liability of professionals or for tax liability. &1, e.g., IND. CODE ANN.§ 23· 
18·3-4 (West, WESTLAW through 2001 1st Reg. Sess.) (''[a] person rendering professional services as a 
member, a manager, [or] an employee ... is personally liable for the consequences of the person's acts or 
omissions to the extent provided by Indiana law or the laws of another state where the person is considered 
responsible"); OHIO REV. CODEANN. § J 705. 48{0) (West, WESTl.A W through I 24th G .A.) ("This chapter 
does not affect any statutory or common law of this or another state that pertains to the relationship between 
an individual who renders a professional service and a recipient of that service, including, but not limited to, 
any contract or tort liability arising out or acu or omissions committed or omitted during the course of 
rendering the professional service!'). For a tax provision, see NEB. REV. STAT.§ 21.2612 (WESTLAW 
·through 2000 Reg. Sess.) e'The members of a limited liability company shall be liable in the same manner 
as a corporate officer for unpaid taxes imposed upon a limited liability company when management is 
reserved to the members."). 
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lack of such a provision as a neutral element in determining whether 
courts should pierce the veil ofLLEs. Mter al~, the courts developed the 
veil piercing doctrine to provide an equitable remedy outside of .the 
corporation statute.1Ml Why should the plain language of the provisions 
providing for limited liability for 1rnembers somehow preclude the 
adoption of this theory for I~I4Es? 141 Another argument is that courts 
could interpret the lack of a statutory provision as an indication that the 
legislature has considered the doctri11e and rejected the applicability of 
the doctrine to LLEs. The doctrine is widely known to legislatures, as 
is illustrated by the number of states that have adopted specific 
language. Why should the lack of su(:h a provision not be deemed to be 
a statement on the legislature's part? Certainly the rapid passage of 
LLE legislation can be seen as an attempt by individual states to provide 
more opportunities for limi~ed liability protection. 
More LLP provisions are silent on the application of the veil piercing 
doctrine than LLC provisions. As most states adopted LLP language 
subsequent to LLC language,- it is possible that legislatures are still 
considering the impact of cotporate doctrine$ to this type of entity. 
Unlike LLC statutes, the adoption of LLP provisions did not require 
state legislatures to draft entirely new provisions with the accompanying 
consideration of corporate common law theories. It is also possible that 
the cotporate attributes of the LLC entity form were deemed to require 
attention to this type of detail versus the relatively short amendments to 
a state's general partnership act. Certainly the narrower scope of the 
limited liability shield in some LLP statutes may be part of the reason 
that the application of the piercing doctrine was not considered as an 
integral part of the process. Finally, the fact that the ULLPA does not 
contain language relating to the doctrine should be considered a possible 
reason for the relatively small number of states that have dealt with this 
issue in their LLP provisions. . 
D. LT.E Ct.rse Law 
Unlike the plethora of cases that interpret the. application of piercing 
the veil to corporations, there are very few cases that have considered 
the issue in the context of an LLC, and to date there is no case in which 
a court pierced the veil of an I,J4P. 142 In cases that have dealt with the 
• 
140. Bahls, supra note 8, at 6~ 1. 
141. Gelb, supra note 31, at 142. See also Schwindt, IUJira note 32, ~t 1555 . 
. 142. Much of this is to be expected as the UC has only come into widespread use in the past decade. 
A search of the Westlaw database in February 200 I did not find any case that involved the piercing of the 
veil ofan LLP. 
• 
• 
• 
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doctrine as it applied to LLCs, there has been limited discussion of the 
factors used to determine whether piercing should occ.ur. 
Given the paucity of case law relating to U.S. LLCs, some 
commentators have utilized foreign entities with similar structures to 
make analogies of what courts may do when faced with the question of 
piercing these types of entities. 143 One often-cited case is Gallinger v~ North 
Star Hospital Mutual Assurance, Ltd.,144 in which the Eighth .Circuit 
considered the appropriateness of piercing the veil of an entity that was 
established in Bermuda. The Bermudan legislation limited the liability 
of each member to the premiums or any unpaid portion thereof due to 
the company.••s The Minnesota test that the Gallinger court utilized 
required that, in addition to showing undercapitalization or lack of 
formalities, a court would have to find that there was an element of 
injustice or fundamental unfairness to the plaintiff. 146 The court found 
that strict common \aw fraud was not necessary to fulfill the second 
element, but it was necessary to present evidence that the entity had 
been operated as a constructive fraud or in an unjust manner .. 147 The 
Gallinger court did not find that this second element was met and instead 
pointed to legislation that limited the liability of the members of the 
entity from the time of its formation. 148 One commentator analyzin,g 
this case argues that the result of Gallinger would have been different had 
a corporation been involved and that the decision would have had the 
effect of raising the bar for piercing LLCs using Minnesota law .. 149 This 
case is especially interesting given that Minnesota is one o~the states that 
includes a provision in its LLC statute providing that this common law 
doctrine may be applied to LLCs. 150 In a later case ,applying Minnesota 
law to a Minnesota LLC, a court followed the Minnesota LLC act 
provision and applied the Minnesota law on piercing but reversed the 
trial court's decision to pierce the veil because the appellate court did 
not find any evidence that a member's misleading statements 
concerning property ownership were intended to mislead the plaintiff. 151 
143. In addition to the Gallinger case discussed in.fra notes 144.148 and accompanying text, see also Abu-
.Nassa,. v. Elders Fraurts Inc., No. 88 Civ. 7906, 1991 WL 45062 (S. 0 .N.Y. Mar. 28, 1991) (involving a 
Lebanese LLC where the court refused to summarily dismiss the piercing claim because there were 
outstanding factual issues relating to alter ego, undercapitalization and lack of formalities). 
144. 64 F.3d 422 (8th Cir. 1995). 
145. ld. at 424. 
146. ld. at 427. 
147. ld. 
14.8. ld. at 428. 
149. Klein, supra note 8, at 149. 
150. SN MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 322B.303 (West, WESTLAW through 2000 Reg. Sess.). 
151. Tom Thumb Food Mkts., Inc. v. TUI Props., LLC, No. C9-98-1277, 1999 WL 31 J 68, at *3 
(Minn. Ct. App.Jan. 26t 1999). The court also focused on the fact that the party requesting piercing did not 
" . •th l h d· u I.J . come ws. c ean an s. '"· 
• 
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A few courts have applied the doctrine to LLCs without even 
considering the defendant's status as an LLC as opposed to a 
corporation. In In re Multimedia Communications Group Wireles~ Associate~ of 
Liher~ Coun~ Georgia, L C., 152 for example, where the defendants included 
Nevada and Florida L~Cs as well as corporations formed in Florida and 
outside the U.S., the court applied Florida veil piercing law to find that 
the entitie~ were. not alter egos of each other, despite facts showing a 
common business location, personnel, computer network and a lack of 
cotporate formalities. 153 
In Dit9 v. Checkrite, Ltd., l54 a Utah federal district court considering 
whether to hold an individual member personally liable under a veil 
piercing analysis simply stated that ''most commentators .assume that the 
doctrine applies to limited liability companies." 155 The Dit~ court did 
not pierce the veil of the entity and fourid th~t the fact that the 
individual played an active role in the business was "only marginally 
probative of the factors considered when detet·mining whether to pierce 
the corporate veil.'' 156 A federal district court in Louisiana in Hollowell 
v. Orleans Regional Hospital recognized that the lack of state law 
requirements relating to formalities, sttch as annual election of directors, 
keeping minutes. or holding meetings, would help determine whether 
veil piercing was appropriate. 157 · . 
152. 212 B.R. 1006 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997). 
153. /d. at 1010 (requiring that (I) the shareholder treat the corporation as an alter ego (2) the 
. . 
corporate form is used fraudulently or for an improper purpose and (3) that such use of the corporate fonn 
caused injury to the claimant). See also, e.g., Sannerv. Fon McDowell Sand and Gravel, 218 B.R. 941 (Bankr. 
D. Ariz. 1998) (analyzing piercing the veil of an entity that is described only as a limited liability company, 
the coun used corporate tenninology without any discussion of the appropriateness of using the theory on 
an LLCJ; Marina, LLC v. Bunon, No. CA 97-1013~ 1998 WL240364(Ark. Ct. App. May 6, 1998)(finding 
no error in lhe refusal to pierce the limited liability veil of Marina, LLC, given that the movant was aware 
of the status of the financing and that Marina, LLC, was a new endty, with no funher discussion on 
applicability of the doctrine to LLCs); New England Nat'l LLC v. Kabro, No. 550014, 2000 WL 254590 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 23, 2000) (dete.rmining whether a Connecticut court had personal jurisdiction over 
two LLCs organized under New York law and the individual members, th-e-court found sufficient facts to 
pierce the .veil of one of the entities and hold personally liable one of the individuals without discussing the 
appropriateness of applying the veil piercing theory); Litchfield Asset Mgmt. v. Howell, No. CV980076827, 
2000 WL 1785122, at •t. •s (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 14, '2000) (referencing the Kabro .case and stating .that 
the veil piercing -theory would apply in dte case of a limited liability company and finding that it was 
appropriate to "reverse pierce,. to access funds invested in a second LLC by a controlling manager); Leisure 
Resort Tech., Inc. v. Trading Cove Assoc., No. CV000091180, 2000 WL 1682535 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 
13, 2000) (declining to pierce the veil· of a LLC when J>laintiff alleged mere conclusions of law without 
addressing status of the entity as a LLC); Vidal, Reynards & Moya. Inc. v. Mountain Springs Co., 248 
A.D. 2d 24 7 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (using a piercing analys1s to reject a request for a trial on the issue without 
discussing the applicability of .the doctrine to the LLC). 
154. 973 F. Supp~ 1320 (D .. Utah 1997). 
155. /d. at 1335 (providing a lengthy list of articles supporting this statement). 
156. Jd. at 1336. 
157. No. Civ. A. 95-4029, 1998 WL 283298 (E.D. La. May, 29 1998). 
• 
• 
• 
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The difficulty in interpreting the results of cases dealing with veil 
piercing in the context of LLCs is that the treatment of the issue has 
been cursoty at best, and in many instances the cases are unreported 
and do not have precedential value. Many of the cases have also 
involved a federal court's interpretation of state_ law. 
E. ~ Future of Veil Piercing 
There is disagre_ement as to whether courts are currendy using the 
veil piercing doctrine on a more permissive basis.158 One commentator 
expects that more veil iercing litigation can be expected with the 
perceived flexible nature of the entity and the interpretation of a 
legislature's intent, courts could find that facts that would support 
piercing in a cotporate cont~xt may be less persuasive in determining 
158. Compat' PRESSER., supra note 42, § 1.06 ("there appears to 'be a much greater willingness to pierce 
the veil than there has been for years") wiiA Thompson', supra note 81, at I 049·-1 050 (finding no trend over 
ti'me and that the percentage of cases where couns pierce _the corporate veil has been relatively constant 
through the 1960s, 1970s and 1~80s). Federal courts have developed common law regarding the doctrine 
or piercing the veil, although these courts looked to state law for guidance so long as state law did not conflict 
with federal interests. Recently, couns' application of personal liability under federal statutory schemes has 
come under a great deal of scrutiny. St»edalizcd rules relating to piercing the veil are derived directly from 
the language or federal statutes that specify enterprise or other status based liability. Stt-generaJ!1 H. Lowell 
Brown;. Parenl-Subsidimy Li4bili!J Under 1M Fareign Corrupt Prattitu Aet. 50 BAYLOR L. REV. I (1998). 
The language_ of federal statutes may specifically impose liability on an entity in a capacity 
different than that of ownership. Gcvuttz, supra note 96, at 904. For example~ under the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), liability may be imposed on an 
"operator,. of a facility. '•Operator,. has been interpreted as the person that controls the activities of the 
facility in question. Such __ persons have included parent corporauons. Cons~ce S. Chandler and Rebecca 
J. Grosser, An ISJW R;.p, for Suj~T~tM Courl ReuimJ: ~lAir Omgrus lnJentkd lo Alllr 1M Common law Ptineiples Of 
Cqrpm-alllimiUd f..iQbilig K'1lm Enacting CERCU, 4 Mo. ENvn. L. & POL'Y REV. 14 ( 1996) (discussing 
whether the standard of liability deriyes from common law principles of corporate law, including veil 
piercing, or from a direct application of the statutory definitions_ of CERCLA). The_ Supreme Court of the 
United States addressed the question and deterntined that a parent corporation could be held directly liable 
as an "operator" Cor its involvement in the management of a subsidiary facility independent of the ownership 
relationship. S. Aron M. Bookman, TrlliUcmding Common Law Ptintipks of limil«l ~of Parenl Corporalions 
/M the Enwonmml, 18 VA. ENvrL. LJ. 555, 556 ( 1999) (discussing United States v. Bestfoods. 524 U.S. 51 
( 1998)). Su al.s~ Cynthia Nance, A.ffiliald Corportllion. ~ UNieriM. WARN Ad, 52 Rt.rrGEJtS L. REV. 495, 
505 (2000) (" [ o] f the fifteen WARN Act cases addressing affiliated corporation liability,_ seven use some form 
of state veil piercing jurisprudence,.). · 
Federal common law regarding veil pie~ing is as confused as that of individual states. Notably, 
there appears to be a trend by some federal couns to allow for veil piercing to occur with greater ease in the 
federal context. PRESSER, supra note 42, § 3.01. S« also Presser, supra note 45, at 175. Given that the 
theoretical basis for assigning liability is federal statutory language, it appears unlikely that IJ .. Es will be able 
to avoid the application of the doctrine in the federal context with any g~ater frequency than other types 
of entities. 
159. Miller, supra note 81, at 86. Professor Miller does not explain why she believes that more 
litigation should be expected with LLCs but only highlights that LLCs are able to use the flow through tax 
treatment traditionally associated with partnerships. ld. 
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whether to pierce the veil ofLLEs. 160 Many commentators who believe 
that courts are likely to apply the doctrine to LLCs agree that a 
mechanical application of the same factors used in the corporate context 
is inappropriate. 161 Given the relatively few cases in which U.S. courts 
have considered piercing an LLC's limited liability veil, it is too early to 
make a blanket statement on how courts will handle this issue given the 
differences between the LLC and corporate structures. There has been 
little discussion of the application of the piercing concept to LLPs. 
However, given the similarity of the limited liability protection, it is 
likely just a matter of time before an attempt is made to pierce the veil 
of an LLP, and the same problems with the application of the doctrine 
will be encountered. 162 
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO THE COMMON LAW 
VEIL PIERCINCt DOCTRINE 
State legislatures in the U.S. have oveiWhelmingly agreed that interest 
holders can obtain limited liability protection by utilizing a variety of 
entity fortns. Due to the cost to creditors inherent ~n limited liability 
systems that protect interest holders, courts have developed limited 
liability exceptions such as the veil piercing doctrine. Legislatures 
should now consider codifying veil-piercing standards in order to 
provide creditors with an equitable remedy and interest holders with 
clear guidelines on proper conduct. 1.,here are several alternatives to the 
current common law approach to veil piercing that can apply such a 
remedy more consistendy. The two primary statutory alternatives 
discussed in this paper are the adoption of a statutory provision to codify 
veil piercing common law and the utilization of existing fraudulent 
transfer provisions. If legislatures want to provide additional protection 
for creditors, they may consider other statutory measures, such as 
requiring minimum capitalization ()f insurance for all entities with 
160. But see Roben B. Thompson, 1'1ll Taming of limiled LiaiJilig Companies, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 921, 
939-40 ( 1995) (stating that the limited liability insulation offered by LLC statutes is unlikely to reach beyond 
what is available by using a corporate foan1). 
16 1. See, e.g., David L. Cohen, T1uorW ofthe CorporaJion and llu l..imiud Liabilig CAmp~: How Slwuld Courts 
and ugislaJures Articulalt Ruks for Piercing 1M V ei4 Fulutimy &sponsibilig and Securilw Regulalitm }Or tJu Limild 
Lillhili!J Company?, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 427, 455 ( 1998). ~also Edwin W. Hecker,] r., 1M Kans4f Reuised Limild 
Liabili!J Compf119 Act, KAN. BJ ., Nov ./Dec. 2000, at 26. Bw see Alting, mpra note 81, at 190 {stating that there 
is "no distinction between corporations and LLCs with respect to piercing the veil,). 
162. Su Hamilton, supra note 12, at I 097 (discussing the application of the veil piercing concepts to 
LLPs); Bishop, supra note 110, at 1026 (discussing the likelihood of applying the piercing concept to LLPs 
fonned under Massachusetts law). 
' 
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limited liability protection or changing the bankruptcy laws to give 
involuntary creditors superpriority.163 . . 
A. Statutory Provision 
One alternative to the current common law system for veil piercing 
is the adoption of a uniform statutory provision articulating the 
circumstances under which an interest holder of an entity will lose the 
limited liability shield. The parameters of the provision could be drafted 
in a variety of ways, but in order for the provision to be useful, it would 
need to have specific standards to provide certainty for interest holders, 
creditors and the courts. One prop-osed test, the Matheson/Eby test, 
specifies fraud, conflicted exchanges and insolvency distributions as the 
circumstances under which the limited liability shield would be removed 
as to claims by voluntary cr~ditors.164 In order for ~ court to apPly the 
Matheson/Eby test,. an entity must be or become tnsolvent.l6 Fraud 
' 
under the Matheson/Eby testis limite.d to an owner (defined .as anyone 
who by reason of an ownership interest is en tided to share in the profits 
of an entity) who fraudulently misrepresents the assets of the entity in 
any material aspect.166 A conflicted exchange under the Matheson/Eby 
test is the transfer to an owner (or other organization in which the owner 
has a material financial interest) for less than reasonably equivale-nt · 
value. 167 Any distribution to an owner that renders an entity insolvent 
is the. final trigger for that owner's losing the limited liability shield 
under the Matheson/Eby test .. 168 
The Matheson/Eby test is a good starting point for drafting a 
statutory version of veil piercing. ·The_ Matheson/Eby test could be 
strengthened by the. addition of provisions similar to those found in the 
· 163. The ability of creditors to use these alternatives is impacted by the creditor's status as involuntary 
or voluntary. Of course, implementing safeguards to protect individuals; specifically involuntary tort 
creditors, is limited only by one's creativity. ~rtainly, changes in the U.S~ system to provide for increased 
safety regulations or universal health care would decrease the likelihood of an individual being injured-in the 
first place or reduce the economic cost of such injuries to individuals, but these types of solutions are beyond 
the scope of this paper. . 
164. John H. Matheson & Raymond B. Eby, ~Doetf'iNojPiircingtkl Veil in an.Era oJMuliip"limiud 
Liabil~ Entitks: An Opportun#y to Codi;b 1M TutjfJr Waiving Owners' limdl!d /.i:abiJig Prot«tion, 7 5 WASH. L. REV. 
. . 
147, 182 (2000). The proposed test specifically provides that the common law doctrine would be 
inapplicable in jurisdictions adopting the model act. ld. at 185. 
165. ld. at 184. 
166. ld, 
167. Id. at 183. Presumably, "reasonably equivalent value" could be interpreted in the same manner 
as the phrase has been interpreted in fraudulent transfer cases. . 
168. Jd. An LLE is insolvent when it is "unable to pay its debts in the ordinary course of business., 
/d. 
' ' 
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Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (<liscussed below). Specifically, any 
proposed test should, as much as U!asible, include definitions for the 
application of concepts such as ''value, and "transfer." Such an act also 
would need to include time limits for bringing an action under any 
statutory provision and specifically articulate judicial remedies. 
One of the challenges for any statutory provision covering veil 
piercing is to allow interest holders who act inappropriately to waive 
limited liability without unduly restricting the ability of parties to 
allocate business risks. Commentators focused on the externalities 
generated by the limited liability system probably would not accept a 
statute ·unless it ensured that tort creditors had some basis for utilizing 
the statute in cases of fraud. 169 
• B. Fraudulent 'l,.ransfer Laws • 
Creditors who are unable to utilize the veil piercing doctrine may still 
be able to collect from interest holciers who behave in a fraudulent 
manner through the application offraudulent transfer laws. 170 Most 
states have adopted a statutory fraud·ulent transfer act. 171 Although no 
one provision has been universally adopted, the two mo.st common types 
of provisions are based on the U11ifonn Fraudulent Transfer Act 
(UIT A) and the older Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (UFCA). 172 
As the majority of states have adopted the UFT A, the focus in this 
section will be on the UFT A's provisions. 173 · · 
• 
169. Matheson and Eby recognize that their model act as currently stated will not cover the claims 
of tort claimants or .claims. based on statutory liabilities, as. the act's application is restricted to voluntary 
creditors. The apparent basis for such a restriction is Jhat these involuntary claimants do not place any 
reliance on the apparent validity of transfers or assets of me business. ld. at 186. In order to provide some 
protection for involuntary creditors, the Matheson/Eby test's provisions waiving limited liability for 
conflicted exchanges and insolvency distributions could be applied regardless of the status of the creditor. 
170. Clark, supra note 82,.-al 542~ This al'ticle, among other issues, discusses the interrelation between 
fraudulent conveyance and piercing the corporate veil. As discussed below, one of the major barriers to the 
use of a fraudulent transfer act is that it will be necessary for the creditor to show that there was a transfer. 
There may be an indefinite number of unfair transactions and it may be difficult or costly to prove that there 
was a lack of fair consideration for such transfers. It!. at 543. As with veil piercing, the application of 
fraudulent transfer law achieves justice between unsecured creditors and debtors. Se~ gmera/9 Marie-T. 
Reilly, The lAtml .E.ffoim,f.y of Fraudulenl Transfer l.mo, 57 LA. L. REV. J 213 (discussing the fact that the 
' predominant view or commenqttors justifying fraudulent transfer law has a strong moralistic flavor). 
17 I. Jeffrey L. LaBine, Mu:n.ipn.'s Adoption of the llnifrmn Fraudulml Tt:ansfer AeL· An Examir,tation tif lhe. 
CJumges Effected 16 I& Stall of FratU!ulenl Conveyanu lmn,. 45 \VA YNE L. REV. 14 79, 1488 ( J 999). The Uniform 
~"raudulent Transfer Act has been adopted by thirty-eight jurisdictions. ld. Non·UFTAjurisdictions have 
adopted the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act or continue to depend on common law. ld. 
172. ld. at 14.8.1 ~ These uniform acts were developed by the NCCUSL to respond to ambiguities in 
fraudulent conveyance law. The UFTA was developed to address issues that arose in the application ofthe 
UFCA. 0ld. at 1487-88. 
173. The UFTA preserved the essential approach a.nd structure of the UFCA, however there are new 
• 
• 
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The UFT A provides creditors with a series of remedies when an 
entity has fraudulendy transferred assets . . The key to the application of 
the UIT A is determining whether a transfer is fraudulent. Transactions 
in which an entity transferred funds with the intent to hinder, delay or 
defraud creditors illustrate the most straightforward application of the 
UFT A. 174 In addition, the UFT A includes "constructive fraud" 
provisions to deal with the challenge of proving intent to defraud, 175 
such as the use of a "balance sheet test" to determine insolvency.176 If 
a debtor does not receive· reasonably equivalent value in exchange for 
incurring an obligation or making a transfer while the debtor is 
insolvent, the creditor can avoid or set aside such transfer.•77 The 
successful application of these constructive. fraud provisions of the 
UFT A allows a remedy for creditors regardless of a debtor's intent. 
As to transfers to insiders, the UFT A provides that a creditor can set 
aside any transfer to an insider who has reasonable cause to believe that 
a debtor is insolvent where the transfer is payment for an antecedent 
debt occurring when the debtor is actually insolvent.178 A creditor must 
prove that an insider had reasonable cause to believe that a debtor is 
insolvent in order to utilize this section of the UFTA. 179 
Remedies available to discourage such transfers include the entry of 
judgment for the value of the assets or the extent of the creditors claim, 
sections in the UFTA that specifically address which transfers and obligations are fraudulent. The UFTA 
incorporates many concepts of the Bankruptcy Code, including definitions of insider and insolvency. Su id. 
at 1487-88. 
• 
174, Barry L. Zaretsky; FraudulenJ Transfer law as lluA.r/JillrofUnreo.sotUJb/4 Riskt 46 S.C. L. REV. 1165, 
1166(1995). These would be t~sactions_ in which the primary intent is to put _assets bey_ond or hide assets 
from creditors. Jd. 
175. JtL at 1166. Constructive fraud provisions fall within a few models. The first model states that 
even if intent to defraud cannot be. shown, it can be implied by transactions where debtors do not receive 
reasonably equivalent value or were financially impaired at the time of or due to th~ transaction. /d. at 1172. 
The second model is based on the Idea that ·~ustice'' towards creditors comes before generosity~ thus some 
transactions are improper towards creditors. ~. iJ. at 1173. In the third model, certain transactions are 
viewed as having the effect of unreasonably increasing the risk faced by creditors and interfering with a 
creditor's ability to -collect on its claims. ld. at II 73-74. 
176. If a creditor cannot show intent to defraud, the only transfers to outsiders covered by the UFT A 
are those for less than reasonably equivalent value taken when a debtor: 
(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which the_ remaining 
assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation· to the business or transaction; or 
(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that he [or .she] would 
incur, debts beyond his [or her] ability to pay as they became due. 
UNIF. FRAUDULENTTRANSFERACT§ 4, 7A U~L.A. 301 (1999). 
177. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER Act §§ 2, 3, 7, 7 A U .L.A. 28.9, 295, 339 ( 1999). 
178. "Insider" is broadly defined in the UFT A to in-clude familial relationships as weU as those based 
on control of entities. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER Ac:r §§ I (7), 4, 7 A U .-L.A. 275, 30 I ( J 999). 
179. The UFT A's burden or proof, of proving reasonable cause to believe that a debtor is insolvent, 
may be easier for creditors to prove than the actual fraud required by some courts that apply the veil piercing 
doctrine. ~ UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT§ 4, 7A U .L.A. '30 1 ( 1'999). 
• 
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injunctive relief against further disposition by the debtor and/ or trans-
feror, and a: provision that allows "any other relief the circumstances· 
may require.,180 Although there are time limits in the UFTA that 
require creditors to act promptly, pr<>visions in the act allow creditors to 
begin ,a proceeding based on the 'UFT A prior to a time that a claim has 
been litigated and reduced to final judgment.181 In addition, the UFT A 
recognizes and remains flexible in the incorporation of equitable 
principles to reflect individual situations that arise under the act. By 
retaining equity as a p~rt of the application of the UIT A, judges will still 
have discretion to avoid a transfer if the facts warrant such a remedy. 
As discussed above, the fraudulent actions of an interest holder are at 
the heart of the veil piercing doctrine. 182 By using fraudulent transfer 
provisions to combat actual and co11structive fraud, courts are able to 
accomplish the goal of veil piercing- fairness by limiting a debtor's 
ability to shift risk to a creditor. 183 Risk allocation between creditors and 
debtors is at the center of the debate relating to limited liability. An 
interest holder's ability to externalize risk through the application of a 
limited liability shield is destroyed through the application of the veil 
piercing theory. In the same manner, an interest holder's ability to 
externalize risk by increasing the level of risk to creditors through 
transactions that interfere with a cre<iitor's ability to collect on its claims 
is one way to view fraudulent conveyance law. 184 Of course, by avoiding 
a transfer, the subsequent transferee m~y have to absorb the loss. 185 
.. 
180. UNIF. FRAUDULENTTRANSFERACT § 7(aX3)(iii), 7A U .L.A. 339 (1999). Other possible remedies 
include the "appointment of a receiver to take charge of the assel transferred or of other property of the 
transferee,., or a coun "may levy execution on the asset transferred -or its proceeds, if a creditor has obtained 
a judgment on a claim against the debtor. UNJF. FllAUttULENTTRANSFERACT §§ 7(a)(3)(ii), 7(b), 7 A U.L.A. 
339·40 ( 1999). 
181. A claim will be extinguished under the UIT.A ifit is not made within (I) four years after a transfer 
is made if there was actual intent (or within one yea·r after the transactiQn could have reasonably been 
discovered); (2) four years for other transfers if constructive fraud is involved; or (3) one year after a transfer 
is made if the transfer is made to an insider for an antecedent debt. UNJF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT 
§ 9, 7 AU .L.A. 359 ( 1999). -Holders of unliquidated tort claims or contingent claims may be creditors under 
the UFTA. UNIF. FRAUDULENTTRANSFERACT§§ 1{3), (4), 7A U.L.A. 275,301 (1999). S~ction 4(a)ofthe 
UIT A states that a creditor'' claim may arise "before •>r after the transfer was made or the .obligation was 
incurred." UNIF.FAAUDUI£NTTRANSFERAcr § 1-, 7A U.L.A. 301 (1999). 
182. See supra_ note 102 el SIIJ. and accompanying text (discussing fraud as a factor in veil piercing). As 
Professor Clark states, the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil may be seen as an application "of the same 
notions of securing the moral obligations of debtors to creditors'which are at work in fraudulent conveyance 
law.u Clark, supra note 82, at 505. 
183. Frederick Tung, Limiled l.i.abili!1 and Crtdilms' Righls: 1M Limits of Risk Shifting lo Creditu.rs, 34 GA. 
L. REV. 54 7 t 566 (2000). 
184. Zaretsky~ supra note 17 4, at 1166-6 7. 
185. Section 8 of the UIT A sets ()Ut the defenses, liability and protection of transferees and specifically 
allows for a good faith transferee to have certain protections in the assets transferred. UNIF. FRAUDULENT 
TRANSFER ACT§ 8, 7 A U .L.A. 35 l. 
• 
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Unless the transfer is to an insider, the loss is merely shifted from one 
creditor to another. 186 It is important to note that a transfer will be 
avoided only if it was made for less than reasonably equivalent value. 
A later-in-time creditor who takes an asset for less than reasonably 
equivalent value could be· viewed as assuming the risk of having a 
transfer undone. 187 Depending on your perspective, the allocation of 
loss to transferees may be too narrow or too broad due to certain 
.protections that transferees have under the UIT A. 
Fraudulent conveyance law has a narrower scope than veil piercing. 
There must be a transfer of som~ type, and a creditor must obtain 
knowledge of such transfer in a timely manner. It can be difficult to 
determine whether "reasonably equivalent value" has been provided, 
especially in situations where there are multiparty transactions. 188 If a 
transfer is made while the entity is solvent, a creditor will have the same 
difficulties of proving actual fraudulent intent as under a veil piercing 
claim. 
The advantage of utilizing fraudulent conveyance law over the veil 
piercing common law is the relative uniformity of fraudulent conveyance 
law and the articulation of specific standards in such laws. The defined 
terms' incorporated in the VITA provide interest holders with a set of 
standards to utilize to determine whether a creditor could successfully 
challenge a particular transfer. Although certain interest holders may 
still decide to make a transfer, the possible repercussions to the parties 
of such a transfer are known, with the remedies set forth in the statute. 
Having a statutory provision to intetpret provides the judicial branch 
with the tools it needs to consistently provide remedies to creditors. 
Although there are many criticisms of fraudulent conveyance l~w, such 
laws at least attempt to provide a framework for the judicial process 
186. Even given this imperfect loss shifting, using fraudulent conveyance law can at least shift loss from 
involuntary to voluntary creditors. S. iJ. 
187. Jd. § 8(a). Section 8(a) states thai a transfer that was made with actual intent is not voidable 
"against a person who took in good faith and for a reasonably equivalent value or against any subsequent 
transferee or obligee." Jd. Due to this saving language, subsequent transferees will be shielded from the 
applicalion of the avoidance remedy. ~ id. 
188. Allenj. Littman, Mullipu fnlmt, Vtii·Piercing, and Burdens and &nefiLr: Fraudulml Conveyance fmo and 
Mullipar~ TranstJCtimu, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 307,312 (1985). An example of such a multiparty problem is 
a guarantee by a subsidiary for a debt of a sister company where a security interest secures the guaranty. 
Courts have adopted several doctrines to assist in applying the concept of reasonably equivalent value, 
including one doctrine that relates to the "identity of interests" of the parties - essentially one aspect of the 
veil piercing doctrine. /d. at 339. For a further discussion on analyzing risk of guaranty liability, see 
Zaretsky, supra note 174, at 1192-99. For an extensive discussion on applying fraudulent transfer law to 
intercorporate guarantees, see jack F. Williams, TJ&e Falla&iesl![Ctmimapormy FraudulenJ Transfer Motkls as Applied 
IQ lnlercorpotalt Guaranties.· Fraudulml Transfer low as a ~9 ~slem, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1403 ( 1994). 
• 
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rather than require judges to rely on the tangled web of decisions that 
constitute the common law on veil piercing. 189 
C. Minimum Capital Requirements/Insurance 
. 
One theory that historically was used to attempt to guarantee that 
funds were available to creditors is the imposition of minimum capital 
requirements on entities_ with limited liability protection. 190 The idea of 
. requiring "adequate'' capital in exchange for the right to do business 
remains a part of current corporate law for specified industries. 191 An 
argument can be made that the barriers these requirements create for 
new entities seeking to enter the market will be offset by the efficiencies 
to so,ciety as a whole by the protection that the requirements provide.192 
If the goal is to provide for a greater amount of assets to be available to 
creditors,· it is necessary to consider minimum capital requirements in 
connection with mandatory insurartce~ Even if regulators decide that 
insurance is not required to cover all possible losses, the requirement of 
mandatory insurance could reduce some of the. risk that involuntary 
creditors would be required to assume under the current syste-m. 193 
' 
189. One argument that fraudulent transfer law alone does not adequately protect creditors is based 
on the proof difficulties inherent in such laws. Tung, supra note 183, at 568. 
190. Most states currently do not require minimum capital requirements for corporations. Hamilton,_ 
supra note 12, at 1076. As discussed above, undercapitalization has been used as a factor to support veil 
• 
piercing. &4 supra notes 112·117 and accompanying text. , . 
191. Capital adequacy _guidelines are used in connection with the supervision of banks. James B. 
Ransom, "Cap.ilal .Adequa&y" in Ctiris: Towards an Oplitmal Bank Deposillnsuranc' Regiml, i S. CAL. INTERDISC. 
LJ. 445, 451 ( 1998). See also genetaJ!y John C. Deal et al., Cof;ilal Punislzmml: TM D«JJh of Limiled li.abil~ frw 
SkatJwltkrsuJFedero.Jg JaguliJJ4d Financiallnstilutiqns, 24 CAP. U. L. REV. 67 (1995). This article includes a brief 
review of the history of capital requirements for federally regulated financial institutions, beginning with the 
minimum capital requirements required by the National Bank Act in 1864. I d. at 70. See a/sQ generally Heath 
Price Tarbert, Are ll . . CapiJalAtlequaty Rulu Atkquall?. 1M &su Acctw.d and BeyqruJ, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 
1771 (2000) (discussing_ the international accord (the Basle Accord) outlining global capital adequacy 
standards). The current capital adequacy guidelines for banks have been subject to a great deal of criticism. 
ld.; i.u o.lso gmero.J!1 Walter I. Conroy, Risk-Based CapiJal AUquaty Gui.tklines: A Sound &gulatory Poli9 or A 
Symptom ofRegu/4Jory lnadequtuy?, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 2395 (1995). 
Another example is_ that certain financial requirements are applied to owners and operators of 
waste-management facilities. John H. Turner, The U.S. EPA 40 C.F.R~ Part 258 Fintw:ial Test/Corporau 
Guaranta -New Envirtmmtn/419' Prot«tive, Cost;.. Efft&tiw Nltchtmirnasfor 1M Demtmstralitm l!f Fuumcial ResponJibili!Y., 
9 FORDHAM ENVTL. LJ. 567 ( 1998)~ This article includes a description of the mechanisms indorsed by the 
Environmental Protection Agency that can be used to demonstrate financial responsibility, including surety 
bonds, insurance or a corporate fina-ocial test. /d. at 588. 
192. But sN Matheson 8t Eby, supra note Hi4, at 177 (arguing that minimum capitalization 
requirements .are not supported in a discussion on· the undercapitalization factor in veil piercing). 
193. Coffey, supra not,e 70, at 90. Essentially, assuming bankruptcy of the entity, the only way that a_ 
. . 
tort victim-can be reimbursed under the-current system is through the relatively low priority that such an 
unsecurt:d creditor is given under the bankruptcy system. By providing for some insurance coverage, the 
tort victim may be able to rtcoup at least some of its losses. 
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The requirement of mandatory liability insurance for entities is an 
idea that has been explored in connection with proposals to eliminate 
limited liability. 194 Unlimited liability can be viewed as a method under 
which interest holders provide insurance to creditors of an entity.195 
Minimum insurance requirements still exist under some state laws. For 
example, several states require entities to maintain a specified level of 
insurance or security in order to maintain status as an LLP. 196 
Although insurance requirements are more common for entities 
rendering certain professional services, the concept could be applied 
across industries}97 The insurance market for liability coverage has 
matured considerably since the beginning of widespread provision of 
limited liability protection for shareholders, and liability insurance is 
available for most businesses. 198 
One advantage of insurance over minimum capital requirements is 
that minimum insurance levels would be set to cover expected losses 
thus leaving to interest holders decisions relating to the appropriate 
capitalization level and mix of the entity. 199 Provisions for insurance 
alternatives, such as segregated funds or minimum net worth 
requirements, would continue to give entities some flexibility in 
allocating their resources. 200 
An initial difficulty with minimum capital requirements or insurance 
coverage is the inflexibility of the standards.201 Given the wide variety 
of possible tort losses across industries and geography (or even 
differences in the average amount of voluntary debt held by entities), it 
would be extremely difficult for regulators to set standards that provide 
an optimal amount of protection for creditors without damping the 
• 
194. See Hansmann & K raakman, supra note 70, at 1927. See tdro.TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. X, 
§ 6132b-3.08 (West, WEST LAW through 1999 Reg. Sess.) (requiring that I.I.Ps maintain S I 00,000 in funds 
that is segregated for the purposes of satisfying judgments against the partnership or carry at least S J 00,000 
in liability insurance). Many entities already carry insurance. An explanation for a corporation's incentive 
to insure is found in Easterbrook&. Fischel, supra note 48, at 52. Sa also Louis De. Alessi, ~ Carporalions 
Insure, 25 ECON. INQUIRY 429 (1987) (analyzing why corporations insure). 
195. Thompson, supra note 4, at 21. Using this premise, the value of the ownership interests in an 
entity would be reduced to reflect the fact that the interest holders are essentially issuing insurance to tort 
creditors. ld. 
196. &-supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text. 
197. ~ t.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 25.05.125 {West, WESTLA W through 2000 Second Spec. 
Sess.) (designating insurance requirements for partners in I .I . .Ps that are required to be licensed to perform 
professional services). 
198. Hansmann &. Kraakman, supra note 70, at 1888; 1926. 
199. · Coffey, supra note 70, at 90. 
200. Su supra text accompanying note 27 (discussing the alternatives to insurance requirements). 
20 I~ Hansmann &. Kraakman, supra note 70, at 1927. An example of the failure to detennine a 
workable regulatory capital standard is the experience of the banking agencies' failure to standardize a 
measure linking a bank's capital adequacy to its level of interest rate risk. Ransom, supra note 191, at 445. 
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ability of parties to enter an industry and successfully become an 
efficient frrn1. 202 The application of insurance coverage and capital · 
requirements for entities with involvement in more than a single type of . 
industry may also seJVe to make th(!Se types of provisions so complex 
that the inefficiencies could overcome the benefit of providing resources 
for creditors. The process of determining the amount of insurance 
coverage would require regulators to make assumptions about the 
average risk that firn1s in particular i1ndustries are willing to take. Some 
firms certainly would be over- or ·under-insured if a regulator made 
these types of detenninations. Given the · non-standard language of 
policy exclusions, regulators would also need to set out minimal 
standards for the coverage of the policies. 203 
In addition to the difficulties of determining appropriate levels of 
capitalization or insurance, another issue that would need to be resolved 
is what should happen if an entity fails to maintain capitalization or 
insurance at the minimum statutory level. 204 Rational arguments can be 
made that the failure to meet any suc:h level Should totally eliminate the 
limited liability protection of the entity. Equally credible arguments can 
be made that the impact of such a failure should be that interest holders 
• 
are personally liable only ug to the amount of minimal capitalization or · 
insurance that is required. 05 . 
In order to encourage compliance with capitalization requirements 
or mandatory insurance coverage, f,ersonalliability could be imposed 
on management employees or controllin~ interest holders of entities that 
do not comply with the statutory no 11m. 20 The difficulty would lie in the 
borderline cases·- how much "contrc>l" does a member of an entity need 
to have before being deemed to be part of this group? Would 
restrictions on the type of decisions that a member has the right to vote 
on be considered when determining this control? One alternative is to 
require at least one individual to be named as potentially personally 
202. Hansmann 8t Kraakman, Stipra note 70, at J 927. In the bankruptcy context, courts have defined 
unreasonably small capi~ in several ways. Garrick A~ Hollander, Defining t•Unrea.ronab!Y Small Capilal" in 
Frmululem Conveyanu Cases" Ralio Anaf1sis Mtg Plouidl an An.swn, 49 Bus. LAw. I 185, 1197 (1994). Various 
ways to define capital include insolvency analysis, cash flow analysis, working capital analysis and a variety · 
of other factors relating to a business' ability to survive. ld. 
203. Thompson, supra note 4, at 21 (pointing out that there has been extensive litigation over the 
interpretation of insurance policy provisions that exclude environmental claims). 
204. This assumes that the statutory scheme requires an entity to maintain a set level at all times. 
205. By lifting the limited liability veil in its entirety, an argument can be made that creditors are being 
overcompensated. Clark, supra note 82, at 54 7, 548. 
206. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 70, at 1927. Professon Hansmann and Kraakman 
' 
specifically discuss corporate officers and directors but of course when dealing with the various types oflJ.Es 
it would be necessary to craft any such statute to include the various types of parties that are involved in all 
of the available entities. 
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liable for breaches of these statutory limits, but of course such a system 
could cause entities to select an individual that is most judgment-proof 
to act in such capacity. Violation of these statutory norms could also be 
a trigger for the eliminati<>:n of limited liability protection for ,all the 
interest holders of an entity. Such a provision would certainly 
encourage interest holders to ~onfirm that the entity in which they 
invested is in compliance with the statute. One problem with such a 
serious consequence for a perhaps minor breach (for example, the 
insuranc-e coverage is just below the statutory requirement) is that the 
benefits oflimited liability, specifically the reduction in monitoring costs, 
would likely be seriously irnpa,cted . 
. 
• 
D. Superpriori!J in Banlaup9 for Tort Claims 
. 
Piercing the veil is obviously not necessary if the entity has sufficient 
assets to meet its obligations. Generally, the doctrine is applied in 
situations where the entity is insolvent and may have already filed for 
bankruptcy protection.207 Although uninsured tort claims do not 
frequently arise in bankruptcy, such claims can be substantial.208 The 
·u·.S. Bankruptcy Code sets forth priorities that determine the order in 
which creditors have access to th~ assets of an insolvent entity. 209 The 
Bankruptcy Code gives certain unsecured priority claims (including 
some wages, contributions to employee benefit plans and tax liabilities) 
and secured claims priority over unsecured claims.210 There is active 
debate as to the efficiency of the bankruptcy priority system as well as 
the impact that the bankruptcy law has on risk taking.-211 One issue 
. 207. Elizabeth E. Brown,_ .A Guide to WanningAIIer Ego Claims, AM. BANKR. INST.j. 15, 16 Oune 1996) 
(discussing uses of th~ piercing doctrine in the bankruptcy setting); Jeremy V. Richards, Alter Ego Claims of 
1M Debtor Vest Excl.usiw!Y in 1114 &taU, 23 CAL BANKR.J. 15 (1996) (discussing cir~uit court decisions on the 
issue of whether the trustee can pursue veil piercing claims). 
208. Lucian Arye Beb¢huk &Jesse .M. Fried, 1M UnefL!1 CaslJIW Ike Priorig ofStcurtd Claims in BanbuplfY: 
FurtMr Tlwugllts and a Rep!J to CtilU:s, 82 CORNEU.. L. REV. 1279, 1297 ( 1997). 
209. Su II U .S.C.A. § 507 (West, WESTLA W through P.L. I 07 ·II, approved 5-28-200 I). 
210. II U .S.C.A. § 506 (West, WESTLA W through P.L. 107-26,-approved 8 ... 17 .. Q I). Secured claims 
take priority only to the extent that the claim is secured by specified collateral. /d. § 506(a). If a claim is only 
partially secured by collateral, the claim is deemed to have priority only to the extent of the secured amount 
of the debt /d. 
211. Steven L. Schwarcz, 71u ,Easy Cos• ftW lhl Priorig f!! Secuttd Claims in Banhupky, 4 7 DUKE LJ. 425 
(1997) (arguing that there are advantages to unsecured debtors supporting the-priority of secured claims}; 
Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 208 (following up on an earlier article discussing, among other issues, the 
economic costs that arise from providing full priority to secured claims in bankruptcy). This article also 
contains :a footnote with an extensive listing of writings relating to the issue of efficiency benefits of the 
priority rules.ld. at 1381 n.5. S.Ludan Arye Bebchuck &Jesse M. Fried, T1u Uruasy Casefor 1M Priorig of 
Secured Claims in Banhupllzl,_ 105 YALE LJ. 857 ( 1996) (offering two rules ofpartial priority to be considered 
as alternatives to the rules of full priority). For a technical discussion of the impact of bankruptcy law on 
• 
• 
• 
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related to this topic is the ability of an entity to grant a security interest 
to a creditor (who thus increases its security for a debt or becomes . 
secure) to the detriment ofinvolunta.ry creditors.212 
Given that voluntary creditors have the ability to allocate risk through 
their investigation of debtors and can require security for their risk, 
legislatures could provide certain involuntary creditors with additional 
protection: by giving tort victims superpriority U·nder the bankruptcy 
laws.213 Allowing superpriority of tort creditors does not in and of itself 
increase the amount of assets available for all creditors but merely 
reallocates this risk.214 Some commentators who argue that the 
bankruptcy system should be changed focus on the ability of voluntary 
creditors to diversify their losses and the relative efficiency of voluntary 
creditors as monitors of tort risks.215 ~fhere are arguments that it will be 
~ inefficient, and perhaps for smaller creditors impracticable, for creditors 
to take on this monitoring role; however, it see_ms to be a n:atural 
extension of the activities of creditors who investigate the management 
of entities ~th which they conduct business.216 In fact, the current 
priority system reduces the incentive of a secured creditor to monitor the 
debtor and attempt to enforce cove.nants relating to risk that are 
included in loan documents.217 One of the many p_otential problems 
with this idea is that cre-ditors .may set forth such stringent restrictions on 
a management's ability to take risks that an entity's abilitY. to develop is 
stifled. Certainly, a secured creditor that loses its priority in bankruptcy 
is likely to charge a higher rate for it'> increased risk.218 
A less dramatic change to the ba:nkruptcy code would be to allow 
involuntary creditors priority over unsecured voluntary creditors.21~ 
invcscrnent in an entity, see Daniel E. Ingberrnan, Triggns and Prioti9: An lnJegrattd Modll of the Effects of 
· Banlauptcy Law on Overinvestnll1lt and Untlerinveslment, 73 WASH. U. L.Q 1341 ( 1994). 
2 J 2. Bebchuck & Fried, supra note 208, at 1297. Presumably if a security interest is granted under 
fraudulent circumstances,. the transaction would fall within the purview of the fraudulent transfer provisions 
and could be avoided. Su supra notes 170·88_ and accompanying text (discussing the role. of fraudulent 
conveyanc:e law). 
213. Leebron, supra note 67, at 1643. Su alro gnuralfy Andrew Price, Tort CreditorS · · and Other 
Proposed Solutions w Corpora14 Limiled l..iahiJig and lhe Problem of &tmuJlilits, 2 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 439 
(1995). 
214. Price, supra note 213, at 468. 
215. Leebron, supra note 67 ,_at 1643. The losses of any creditor would be limited to the amount of 
the loan. In addition, a superpriority rule would, in <:onnection with tort risks, restore capital structure 
neutrality. 
216. See also Price, supra note 213, at 4 76 (discussing increased monitoring :costs for firms). 
217. Bebchuk& Fried, supra note 208, at 1315. 
218. Price, supra note 213, at 464. 
219. Coffey, SJJ!wa note 70, at 87. This altemativf: raises the difficulty of detem1ining which creditors 
are voluntary. An example of a gray area is if there are wo.rkplace or product liability injuries where the 
creditor had a pre-existing voluntary relationship with the entity. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 70,_ 
• 
• 
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. 
Other options are to allow fo:r partial priority of secured creditors220 or 
to set aside a portion of a debtor'·s collateral for unsecured creditors.221 
Any change to allow for priority for involuntary tort creditors will need 
to take into account the relative efficiencies of secured debt~ A higher 
cost for financing could m~an that entities have fewer liquid assets 
available for distribution to all creditors. 222 · 
V. RECOMMENOATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
The result of the introduction of new limited liability entity forms and 
the subsequent amendment of rules relating to them is that there are no 
real differences among entities in regard to the liability protection 
available to their interest holders. 223 The universality of the liability 
protection among all the entities means that all interest holders, whether 
partners, members or shareholders, can be treated the same with resp-ect 
to the exceptional situations that warrant the loss of limited liability.224 
Rather than apply the flawed veil piercing doctrine to these new entities 
at 1920. One way to resolve this issue is to consider whether the victim could_have reasonably understood 
to have "contracted with the fir1n in substantial awareness of the risks of injury involved." Jd. at 1921. 
Clearly, some voluntary creditors, such as employees and small suppliers, will have fewer methods to ensure 
their protection than financial crcditon. Tung, supra note 183, at 555. Consumer creditors also are difficull 
to protect. Although consumers generally have the ability tQ choose who they deal with, they generally can 
not determine the financial status of the entity tha~ may uhima~ely be liable for' their contract claims. 
220. Bebchuk &. Fried, svJ1ra note 208, at 1328 (discussing the cost and availability of financing under 
partial priority). 
221. Schwarcz, supra note 211, at 427. q. .Gary E. Claar, 1M CaseJtW a Bttnlaup.ky Cotk ~for 
C~«mup Claims, 18 WM. MITCHEJ.LL. REV. 29 ( 1992) (arguing that a predictable level of priority 
for cleanup claims would serve the interests of creditors as well as enforcers of environmental liability). 
222. The additional cost of the financing would decrease the availability of assets for other investment 
opponunides both within and outaide-of the entity. 
223. For an argument that it is time to scrap the multitude ofaltemate forms of business organizations 
for a "limited entity .. statute for small business, see Dale A. Oesterle&. Wayne M. Gazur, ~~in a Name?: 
An Argumtn~fM a Small Bu.ritws "LimiteJ litJbi~i!1 Enlig" SIIJJull (U"alla 11nw Subsets of Defaull Rriw), 32 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 101 (1997). An alternative proposed by Professor Ribstein is statutory authorization for 
"'Contractual Entities" in which owner liability as well as other terrns would be gov~med solely by such 
entity's filed operating agreement. Larfl: E. Jtibstein, limiled /.iJJJJiJig Unlimiletl, 24 DEL.J. CORP. L. 407 
(1999). &, also William A~ Klein&. Eric M. Zolt,llwinus Form, limiltlllinbility, and Tax Reginw: lmching 
Toward a Cohemtl Ouko1111, 66 U. COLO. L. R.EV. I 00 I, 1041 ( 1995) (proposing that lawmakers stan from 
scratch to create a set of state laws for business associations based on limited liability and tax regimes). Note 
that the Klein and Zolt article was published prior to the adoption of the "check-the-box, niles that allow 
for the election by any non-corporate entity 9f partnership_ or corporate tax treatment. 
224. In fact, the commcn&ary that ·supports the application of the veil piercing theory to LLCs supports 
this proposition. S, supra notes 159-61. ctf. Kl~in & Zolt, supra note 223, at 1036. After an examination of 
the various argumenta relating tQ limited liability, K'ein and Zolt stated that "the most important proposition 
that emerges [from such discu~ion] ._ .. is chat none Juggestthat deciding whether to grant limited liability 
should turn on the choice of business (orm.•• ld. Just as granting limited liability no longer turns on the 
choice of business form, it does not make sense that ·the application of a theory that eliminates this attribute 
should tum on the same choice. · 
' 
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and continue to apply the theory to corporations, legislatures should 
consider the underlying policy isst1es supporting . veil piercing and 
implement solutions that d.irecdy address those co·ncerns. Legislatures 
have demonstrated their willingness to break with established rules 
relating to corporations and partnerships and reshape the environment 
in which entities do business. 225 The adoption of a statutory provision 
to codify veil piercing and the increased use of existing statutory 
language relating to fraudulent transfers, along with other statutory 
reforms, can address the underlying J~olicy concerns relating to limited 
liability and provide courts with a stnacture that allows for the provision 
of a remedy in a more consistent manner . 
• 
225. For an example of the pletho~ of entity forms available to practitioners. see William H. Clark, 
What the Bwitws World is Loo/cingfM in an Orgonicalitmal Ftnrn: 7'111 ~bJaniiJ Experience, 32 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 149 (1997). 
• 
